More on the Bible and rape. A reply to Matthew Flannagan.

In an earlier post, I replied to Copan’s argument in defense on some biblical passages. But now I’d like to address some of the passages in question in more detail, as well as other passages involving related manners. In particular, I will reply to Matthew Flannagan’s interpretation of them [1] – though my points will not be limited to a reply to his arguments.

I will quote from the World English Bible, but I will also consider some arguments involving the original Hebrew text.

Deuteronomy 22 says:

22. If a man is found lying with a woman married to a husband, then they shall both die, the man who lay with the woman and the woman. So you shall remove the evil from Israel. 23 If there is a young lady who is a virgin pledged to be married to a husband, and a man finds her in the city, and lies with her, 24 then you shall bring them both out to the gate of that city, and you shall stone them to death with stones; the lady, because she didn’t cry, being in the city; and the man, because he has humbled his neighbor’s wife. So you shall remove the evil from among you. 25 But if the man finds the lady who is pledged to be married in the field, and the man forces her and lies with her, then only the man who lay with her shall die; 26 but to the lady you shall do nothing. There is in the lady no sin worthy of death; for as when a man rises against his neighbor and kills him, even so is this matter; 27 for he found her in the field, the pledged to be married lady cried, and there was no one to save her. 28 If a man finds a lady who is a virgin, who is not pledged to be married, grabs her and lies with her, and they are found, 29 then the man who lay with her shall give to the lady’s father fifty shekels‡ of silver. She shall be his wife, because he has humbled her. He may not put her away all his days.

Matthew Flannagan’s argument is about Deuteronomy 22:28-29, and considers also the context of the verse, in particular the previous passages. He claims that Deuteronomy 22:28-29 is not about cases of rape, but about cases of seduction.

He gives the following main reasons for his assessment (in my words; you can read his own argument here).

1. The word used in the original (in Hebrew) is “tabas”, which does not indicate the use of force. While in some cases that word is used when there is force, in some cases, it’s used when there is no force. But in previous verses in the same context, when the case is clearly one of rape (i. e., in the case of the woman raped in the field), the word “chazak” is used.

2. Deuteronomy 22:28-29 repeats a law in Exodus 22:15 (probably a typo; it’s Exodus 22:16), as Deuteronomy repeats many of the commands in Exodus. In the Exodus case, it’s clear that it’s not about cases of rape: the word used in Exodus means “seduces”.

3. If the Bible commanded that the victim of rape marry her rapist, that would be a cruel command that would clash with strong moral intuitions. In absence of specific reasons, the interpretation of divine commands that is more in line with moral intuitions should be preferred.

I will reply to all 3 points, and make my own case supporting the assessments that:

a. It’s probable that the passage in Deuteronomy 22:28-29 was neither only about cases of rape nor about cases of consensual sex only, but included both. Else, it probably included only cases of rape. [2]

b. The commands surrounding it - like many others in the Bible on related matters – are cruel and morally heinous.

Let’s consider point 1. first.

Before we entertain other reasons, it seems that if the lawmaker had intended to talk about rape exclusively, it looks more likely that he would have used the word “chazak”. That word was used in immediately previous verses and in the same context (see the biblical passage quoted above), and would have been the command clearly about cases of rape.

On the other hand, if the lawmaker had intended to refer to cases of consensual sex either – just repeating the command in Exodus -, then it seems more likely he would have used a word that makes clear that it’s not about cases in which there is used of force – i. e., not about rape, in this context -, as the lawmaker of Exodus did.

The fact that the lawmaker used a different word – one that can be used both for cases of force and for cases in which there is no use of force – supports the hypothesis that the lawmaker gave a command applicable to both cases.

Let’s now go deeper, and consider the context. The previous passages consider a case of rape (Deuteronomy 22:25-27), but the evidence shows conclusively that the rapist is not at all punished for rape, for the following reasons:

In Deuteronomy 22:23-24, the lawmaker clearly believes that there is no rape, but consensual sex between a man and a woman pledged to be married to another man.

Now, her not crying is by not mean conclusive evidence that she was not raped. It may well be that – say – he put a knife to her throat and she was too afraid to cry – and with good reason -, so she did not cry. I guess it might be argued that other words clearly indicate consent, but in any event, the lawmaker assumes she had consensual sex with him, and the punishment for both of them is death by stoning. That is clearly not a punishment for rape, since she did not rape anyone, and the lawmaker believes he did not, either. It’s clearly a punishment for some sort of behavior going against the will of the father or the other man, or both, or their agreement, etc. (whatever the behavior the lawmaker thought was worthy of death by stoning), but not at all for rape.
Now, in the verses that follow those immediately (Deuteronomy 22:25-27), the lawmaker imposes exactly the same punishment to a rapist who rapes a woman pledged to be married to another man.

If the lawmaker had intended to punish a man for raping a woman, then it would make no sense to include the condition that she be pledged to another man. But the condition is there. And the punishment is, as I pointed out above, exactly the same as the punishment in the consensual sex case.

This is very strong evidence that the punishment in Deuteronomy 22:25-27 is not for rape, but as in the case above, for some sort of behavior going against the will of the father or the other man, or both, or their agreement, etc., but not for rape. Here, the behavior here that the lawmaker deems worthy of death by stoning is not rape, but whatever “offense” against the father/third party the lawmaker had in mind, and is the same punishment for the man regardless of whether the woman consents. As for the woman, she only incurs punishment if she also consents.

At this point, it might be suggested that death by stoning is imposed to the rapist both for the rape and for the action against the father, and that’s why the condition that she be pledged to another man is included in Deuteronomy 22:23-24. However, if that were the case and the lawmaker intended to impose death by stoning for rape, then he would have added another verse imposing death by stoning for the rape of a woman not pledged to another man. But this is not the case.

Alternatively, it might be suggested also that the lawmaker thought that raping a woman pledged to another man was worthy of death by stoning because of the rape – and regardless of the pledge -, but he thought the rape of a woman not pledged to another man was worthy of a lesser punishment. But that does not seem probable: if the pledge is not the key difference, why would the rape itself be worthy of death by stoning if she’s pledged to another man, but not if she isn’t? And where is the punishment for the rape of women not pledged to other men?

An alternative interpretation is that maybe the punishment for the rape of women not pledged to other men is precisely Deuteronomy 22:28-29. On this alternative, the Deuteronomy lawmaker did want to punish rape, but he thought that for rape, a smaller punishment was merited than for the other “offenses”. So, the punishment of death by stoning in Deuteronomy 22:25-27 is for some offense against the father and/or the other man as explained above, which would be in the lawmaker’s twisted mind far worse than rape, and there was not much point in adding some extra punishment for rape in Deuteronomy 22:25-27. This alternative hypothesis holds that the lawmaker in Deuteronomy left the case of consensual sex to Exodus 22:16, and wanted to consider only the case of rape in Deuteronomy 22:28-29. For that reason too, the lawmaker introduced a new condition, namely that “He may not put her away all his days.”. That is condition not present in Exodus, and the Deuteronomy lawmaker thought it would be in her interest – as part of his vast confusion about morality and human psychology.

While I don’t think we can rule out that alternative interpretation – or something like it - beyond a reasonable doubt, in context it seems more probable that Deuteronomy 22:28-29 included both cases of rape and cases of consensual sex, mainly for two reasons:

i. There would seem to be no reason for the lawmaker to use a word that is not limited to cases in which force is used if he meant to include only cases in which it is, especially given that in the preceding verses, he used a word that clearly indicated the use of force.

ii. In general, and considering other verses as well, the Deuteronomy lawmaker seems uninterested in punishing rape; in fact, in some cases, it allows it or even commands it (I’ll say more on this later).

So, it seems probable – in their cultural framework, strongly oppressive against women – that the monetary punishment in Deuteronomy 22:28-29 is a punishment for reducing her value as a potential bride, given that her hymen would very probably be broken. As for the command to marry her, it was probably a twisted way of thinking of her protection, without asking for her consent – by the way, even if the sex was consensual, she may well not consent to further sex or to marriage, but she was given no such choice. So, one way or another, she could be end up being forced to marry her rapist.

I will now address point 2.

It’s true that the book of Deuteronomy sometimes repeats some legal dispositions included in Exodus, but also, it adds new legal dispositions. In particular, the command in Deuteronomy 22:28-29 uses different language from the command in Exodus 22:16, and no longer uses a word that is exclusively about consensual cases.

Moreover, Deuteronomy 22:28-29 is clearly written in the context of the immediately previous verses - namely Deuteronomy 22:23-24 and 25-27 -, and should be interpreted in that context. And in that context, the hypothesis that Deuteronomy 22:28-29 was only about cases of consensual sex wouldn’t seen to make any sense:

In fact, if the lawmaker of Deuteronomy was willing to punish a man for reducing a virgin’s “value” by having consensual sex with her, why would he let the rapist who equally reduces her “value” get away with it unpunished?

It might be suggested that the reason for the monetary punishment in Deuteronomy 22:28-29 is not that her “value” was reduced, but – say – it was a punishment for “seducing” women not pledged to other men. Did the Deuteronomy lawmaker thought that seduction of women not pledged to other men merited punishment, but rape didn’t merit any? He was overall a very, very confused person, so I guess one might suspect so at first. But if so, why the money for the father? The punishment seems to be about her “value” as a virgin – at least, the part of the punishment consisting on the money for the father. But it would seem to make no sense not to also impose a punishment on the rapist who diminishes her “value” in a similar fashion.

Granted, Exodus also does not consider the case of rape, so it might be suggested the lawmaker in Deuteronomy also didn’t think of that possibility in Deuteronomy 22:28-29, either. But in this context, the lawmaker clearly has in mind the possibility of rape – considering the immediately previous verses -, so it’s improbable that he simply forgot about that possibility and decided to consider only cases of consensual sex, while at the same time changing the word with respect to Exodus, and picking a new word that could apply both to consensual cases and to rape, instead of using a word that would apply only to consensual cases as in Exodus. It seems far more probable that the change in the wording with respect to Exodus was precisely meant to include both cases of rape and cases of consensual sex.

Regarding point 3., my reply is that:

i. We actually do have specific reasons – which I have explained above -, on the basis of which we should reckon that it’s very probable that Deuteronomy 22:28-29 included cases of rape – and probably not exclusively cases of rape -, even if the proposed general principle of interpretation were true.

We may not have established beyond any reasonable doubt that it covered cases of rape, but we’ve established it’s very likely.

ii. The proposed principle is not true: the lawmakers of Deuteronomy and generally the Old Testament were very, very confused about many aspects of morality, and as a result, Old Testament Law is overall profoundly unjust - I have argued for that in more detail in my Moral Case against Christianity, and I will provide some examples below -. There is no good reason to consider, all other things equal, that an interpretation that renders a biblical command just – or even less unjust – is particularly more probable than a heinous one.

Instead, what we should consider is how an interpretation of a particular command coheres with its context – of course -, and also with other commands regarding similar matters, which may give us a clue as to what sort of framework the lawmaker/s was/were working with. Now, sometimes, all of that is not enough to settle the matter conclusively, but only to make assessments about which interpretations are more or less probable, in which case, we should acknowledge so.

In the particular case under consideration, a relevant factor – though we have very strong and more direct evidence already - is what the lawmaker of Deuteronomy – and, to a much lesser extent, the rest of the Old Testament since they may have influenced Deuteronomy – thought about women’s freedom to choose their sexual partners, rape, etc., and how he/they treated them.

As we shall see below, said lawmaker/s was/were particularly immoral when it came to dealing with such matters, regularly violating a woman’s freedom of choice, and either permitting – and implying moral permissibility – of rape in several cases, or even mandating sex regardless of a woman’s choice – which would be a command to rape her, when she fails to consent.

I will address the context and how biblical law – in particular, Deuteronomy – deals with women’s sexuality and sexual freedom below, but before I get to that, I’d like to point out that other commands in the immediate context of Deuteronomy 22:28-29 were also deeply unjust – heinous – even if one grants the very improbable interpretation that Deuteronomy 22:28-29 is only about cases of consensual sex. Part of the injustice is that in 22:25-27 a rapist is stoned to death for some sort of “offense” against the victim’s father – for which he surely doesn’t deserve death -, and is not punished for the rape at all – for which he deserves punishment, though probably not death by stoning.

However, the dispositions in Deuteronomy 22:24-27 are even much worse, since the victims of the injustice are not deserving of any significant punishment at all – or even not any punishment. The situation is as follows:

A man and a woman have consensual sex. She was pledged to another man. Deuteronomy 22:24-27 commands that they both be stoned to death. It should be apparent that that’s extremely unjust on its own, even assuming that she was required to consent to the pledge. There seems to be no good reason to think there was such requirement in the Bible, though. On the contrary, the biblical evidence mostly supports otherwise. Still, let’s assume for now that she was required to consent to the pledge. The fact remains that the commands in Deuteronomy 22:22 and Deuteronomy 22:23-24 are also in conflict with very strong moral intuitions. There is no good reason to put our sense of right and wrong aside and accept that such behavior is acceptable, let alone obligatory.

At this point, someone might say that given that God commanded it, it was obligatory. I would say that for that matter, if that reply were successful, it would also work in the case of Deuteronomy 22:28-29, when a woman is forced to marry her rapist. But of course, it’s not at all a successful reply.

Let’s consider a present-day analogy: a man is told that they should stone people to death - or hang, or otherwise execute - for behaviors such as adultery, apostasy, blasphemy, and so on. They are also told that an omnimax (i. e., omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect) creator commanded so. It’s apparent that their behavior is morally appalling if they follow the commands willingly – leaving aside threats to their lives or their families, which would make the moral assessment of their behavior more complicated -, and that they ought not to believe that the commands were given by an omnimax creator. But the same applies to the people who lived in ancient Israel, and who were told that the commands in Deuteronomy were from an omnimax creator, or at least from an extremely powerful and good creator. They should not have believed that an extremely good and powerful creator had issued such commands. But what if Yahweh, the biblical creator, actually made a display of power? Should they not have believed that an omnimax creator gave the commands?

It’s obvious to me that that never happened – since Yahweh does not exist -, but assuming that those displays of power did happen, the answer remains no – of course not.

One point that one can make here is that if Yahweh made displays of power, the vast majority of the people who received the biblical commands did not see such displays – they were just told about them, as are people who presently engage in similarly atrocious behavior are told about putative displays of power. Even granting that Yahweh’s displays of power were real and those present-day people are told about were not, in both cases the people following the commands were just told about them.

However, there is a stronger and much more direct reply: even the people who saw those amazing displays of power should not have believed that the agent giving such atrocious commands was an omnimax creator. They should have believed of course that he (or maybe rather “it”?) was a very powerful agent, but they should not have believe that he was morally good, let alone morally perfect, or that his abhorrent commands were just.

Another objection might be that allegedly Israel would have been destroyed without those punishments, because keeping the bloodlines clear was very important to them. But for that matter, keeping the bloodlines clear is also very important in present-day social groups that have atrocious laws in those regards. If the laws were repelled, those groups would perhaps change significantly, but for the better, since those very immoral punishments would no longer be the law. The same applies to ancient Israel (besides, assuming a woman’s consent was required, there is no good reason to think a high percentage of women would be cheating on their fiancés; still, it should be clear that even that would not remotely justify the punishments).

Leaving aside the injustice in Deuteronomy 22:22-24, let’s go back now to the question of consent, how Deuteronomy – and biblical law in general – often treats a woman’s sexual freedom.

First, in general cases of marriage, the Bible does not say that a woman’s consent was required. Now, the Bible does not deny that it was, either, so it’s silent. But the following biblical examples support the conclusion that it wasn’t required:

Joshua 15:

15:13 To Caleb the son of Jephunneh he gave a portion among the children of Judah, according to the commandment of Yahweh to Joshua, even Kiriath Arba, which Arba was the father of Anak (the same is Hebron). 15:14 Caleb drove out there the three sons of Anak: Sheshai, and Ahiman, and Talmai, the children of Anak. 15:15 He went up there against the inhabitants of Debir: now the name of Debir before was Kiriath Sepher. 15:16 Caleb said, He who strikes Kiriath Sepher, and takes it, to him will I give Achsah my daughter as wife. 15:17 Othniel the son of Kenaz, the brother of Caleb, took it: and he gave him Achsah his daughter as wife.

Judges 1:

1:11 From there he went against the inhabitants of Debir. (Now the name of Debir before was Kiriath Sepher.) 1:12 Caleb said, He who strikes Kiriath Sepher, and takes it, to him will I give Achsah my daughter as wife. 1:13 Othniel the son of Kenaz, Caleb's younger brother, took it: and he gave him Achsah his daughter as wife.

Here, Caleb openly promises to give his daughter Achsah as wife to whoever strikes and takes Kiriath Sepher. There is no suggestion in the Bible that the promise was illegal, or that it was conditioned to Achsah’s agreement, or that Achsah had previously agreed. No one seems to have asked for clarification, either. The passage simply does not highlight that behavior as abnormal in any way. And when Othniel took Kiriath Sepher, Caleb gave him Achsah as wife – as Caleb had promised -, again without any suggestion of an illegal act, or that she had a say on the matter. Again, this is not to say that, in this particular case, that she was forced. Maybe she was not. But rather, that there was no legal requirement that she consented.

1 Samuel 17

17:22 David left his baggage in the hand of the keeper of the baggage, and ran to the army, and came and greeted his brothers. 17:23 As he talked with them, behold, there came up the champion, the Philistine of Gath, Goliath by name, out of the ranks of the Philistines, and spoke according to the same words: and David heard them. 17:24 All the men of Israel, when they saw the man, fled from him, and were sore afraid. 17:25 The men of Israel said, Have you seen this man who is come up? surely to defy Israel is he come up: and it shall be, that the man who kills him, the king will enrich him with great riches, and will give him his daughter, and make his father's house free in Israel.

Here, too, it seems that the king would give his daughter to whoever could defeat Goliath. It could be anyone. There is no suggestion of a condition that she had to consent.

2 Kings 14

14:5 It happened, as soon as the kingdom was established in his hand, that he killed his servants who had slain the king his father: 14:6 but the children of the murderers he didn't put to death; according to that which is written in the book of the law of Moses, as Yahweh commanded, saying, The fathers shall not be put to death for the children, nor the children be put to death for the fathers; but every man shall die for his own sin. 14:7 He killed of Edom in the Valley of Salt ten thousand, and took Sela by war, and called its name Joktheel, to this day. 14:8 Then Amaziah sent messengers to Jehoash, the son of Jehoahaz son of Jehu, king of Israel, saying, Come, let us look one another in the face. 14:9 Jehoash the king of Israel sent to Amaziah king of Judah, saying, The thistle that was in Lebanon sent to the cedar that was in Lebanon, saying, Give your daughter to my son as wife: and there passed by a wild animal that was in Lebanon, and trod down the thistle. 14:10 You have indeed struck Edom, and your heart has lifted you up: glory of it, and abide at home; for why should you meddle to your hurt, that you should fall, even you, and Judah with you? 14:11 But Amaziah would not hear.

So, Jehoash – the king of Israel – told Amaziah – the king of Judah – to give his daughter to Jehoash’s son as wife. While Amaziah did not accept, that seemed like a negotiation between two kings, with no suggestion that Amaziah’s daughter’s consent was legally required.

Given the passages above, the biblical evidence supports the conclusion that there was no requirement that a woman agree to be pledged. It’s not evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, but it’s enough to make it probable that consent was not required by those laws (other laws may have required consent, in some periods).

As I mentioned before, I’m not suggesting no fathers considered their daughters’ choices – either in the real ancient Israel or in the ancient Israel of the biblical story, but I’m assuming for the sake of the argument that the stories did happen. But the point is that the daughter’s consent was apparently not legally required in these stories. So, in particular, it seems a woman who was pledged to a man she did not want to get married to and had sex with someone else could be legally stoned to death for that (though as I pointed out before, the injustice of the punishment is huge even in the cases in which she consented).

But even if we leave those cases aside for whatever reason, there are others in which the injustices committed by the biblical lawmakers can be seen more clearly. I will comment on some of them:

Deuteronomy 25.

5 If brothers dwell together, and one of them dies and has no son, the wife of the dead shall not be married outside to a stranger. Her husband’s brother shall go in to her, and take her as his wife, and perform the duty of a husband’s brother to her. 6 It shall be that the firstborn whom she bears shall succeed in the name of his brother who is dead, that his name not be blotted out of Israel.

7 If the man doesn’t want to take his brother’s wife, then his brother’s wife shall go up to the gate to the elders, and say, “My husband’s brother refuses to raise up to his brother a name in Israel. He will not perform the duty of a husband’s brother to me.” 8 Then the elders of his city shall call him, and speak to him. If he stands and says, “I don’t want to take her,” 9 then his brother’s wife shall come to him in the presence of the elders, and loose his sandal from off his foot, and spit in his face. She shall answer and say, “So shall it be done to the man who does not build up his brother’s house.” 10 His name shall be called in Israel, “The house of him who had his sandal removed.”

In this case, sexual penetration is commanded, regardless of the choices of either the woman or the man. That would in particular include cases of rape, where she does not consent. And the rape would be not only legal, but legally obligatory. As for the man, he can refuse to have sex, though he would have to pay a price in terms of reputation it seems – and she’s mandated to demand that he “perform the duty of a husband’s brother” to her, which may well be an obligation to demand her own rape. What if she didn’t want him to perform the “duty”? The biblical lawmaker simply does not care. At all. He gives the command anyway.

Here’s another heinous case, also in Deuteronomy:

Deuteronomy 25:

10 When you go out to battle against your enemies, and Yahweh your God delivers them into your hands and you carry them away captive, 11 and see among the captives a beautiful woman, and you are attracted to her, and desire to take her as your wife, 12 then you shall bring her home to your house. She shall shave her head and trim her nails. 13 She shall take off the clothing of her captivity, and shall remain in your house, and bewail her father and her mother a full month. After that you shall go in to her and be her husband, and she shall be your wife. 14 It shall be, if you have no delight in her, then you shall let her go where she desires; but you shall not sell her at all for money. You shall not deal with her as a slave, because you have humbled her.

This passage does not command rape. However, it clearly allows rape. An ancient Israelite soldier is allowed to kidnap a woman, and after give her a month to mourn her parents – killed in the Israelite attack, which of course targeted civilians as well as combatants -, he is legally free to rape her. In context, the lawmaker implies – falsely and without justification, of course – that the soldier’s behavior – which would be grossly immoral – would be morally acceptable.

The following is from Numbers – so, this is another biblical lawmaker.

Exodus 21:

7 “If a man sells his daughter to be a female servant, she shall not go out as the male servants do. 8 If she doesn’t please her master, who has married her to himself, then he shall let her be redeemed. He shall have no right to sell her to a foreign people, since he has dealt deceitfully with her. 9 If he marries her to his son, he shall deal with her as a daughter. 10 If he takes another wife to himself, he shall not diminish her food, her clothing, and her marital rights. 11 If he doesn’t do these three things for her, she may go free without paying any money.

In this particular case, it’s apparent that her consent isn’t needed: a man is allowed to sell his daughter – that’s his prerogative, not her choice. Then, her master marries her to himself, or to his son. Again, that’s the master’s choice. There is no indication whatsoever that her choice was required. Now, these passages are concerned with providing a minimum amount of protection for her. But that’s from the perspective of a very, very twisted sense of morality, which fails to recognize how abhorrent the situation is and the laws are, where she can be raped legally by a man who made a deal with her father.

[1] I recently replied also on his blog. His original post is from 2009, but he posted a comment to the thread in April, 2017, so the discussion over there seems to be still active at the time I’m writing this.

[2] In an earlier version of this post, I gave less credence to the hypothesis that Deuteronomy 22:28-29 was only about rape. After further consideration, I introduced some modifications to consider a variant that raises the probability that it was only about rape – though I still consider it less probable than the alternative that it includes both cases of rape and cases of consensual sex.

A Moral Case Against Christianity (v. 8.0)

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A Moral Case Against Christianity

0) Introduction and some terminology

1) Preliminary issues

1.1) Moral realism and theism

1.2) The Bible and the sources of moral knowledge

1.3) Sovereignty

1.4) Who are we to judge God?

1.5) Judging hypothetical characters

1.6) Our sense of right and wrong and Christianity

1.7) The Fall

1.8) The Old Testament and Christianity

1.9) Hell and Christianity

1.10) Context

2) Immoral laws and false moral claims in the Old Testament

2.1) Women stoned to death for having sex before marriage

2.2) Women and men burned to death for getting into an outlawed kind of marriage

2.3) Women burned to death for prostitution

2.4) Men executed for having sex with other men

2.5) Women and non-human animals executed for having inter-species sex

2.6) Oxen stoned to death as a punishment

2.7) An assortment of immoral commands and false moral claims

2.8) The hardness of the hearts of the ancient Hebrews

3) David's murder of Uriah, and the biblical god's immoral reaction

4) Jesus and the biblical god

5) Jesus and "family values"

6) Hell

6.1) Infinite Hell vs. finite Hell or no Hell

6.2) Hell as a place of torment vs. Hell as some state of mind or state of being

6.3) Hell as imposed vs. Hell as chosen by the damned

6.4) The evil of Hell

7) Conclusion

Notes and references

0) Introduction and some terminology

1) In this article, I will make a case against Christianity based on the actions of the biblical god, arguing that he isn't morally good, let alone morally perfect.

2) I will not define "Christianity", but will try to make this case as broad as I can, in order to encompass nearly all if not all religions that go by the name "Christianity".[1]

3) By "the biblical god" I mean the entity described in the Bible, and who is claimed to be the creator.

There are of course different versions of the Bible: Not only are there different translations, but also different beliefs about which books are inspired.

As I mentioned before, I will try to make the case as broad as a can, in order to encompass different versions.

4) By "God" I mean an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being, creator of all other beings.

Christians usually claim that the biblical god is God, and also usually just say "God" - they never say "biblical god", as far as I know.

However, when considering objections, and for the sake of clarity, I will usually use the expression "biblical god" to make clear what the objection actually consists in, even if Christians would say "God", rather than "the biblical god".

5) By a "moral agent" I mean any being that has moral properties, like being morally good, or morally evil, or something in between, and/or whose actions are sometimes immoral, or morally good, etc. For instance, nearly all adult humans are moral beings, whereas, say, sharks are not.

6) All quotes of biblical passages are from the King James Version (KJV).

I don't believe that the KJV is a good translation, but the passages in question are similar in all mainstream versions, so this should not be a problem.

7) When I talk about the actions of the biblical god, of course I'm not actually claiming that he exists. I'm just taking into consideration the actions as described by books Christianity claims are inspired.

I will give some more details on this point later.

8) I only refer to different parts of this article as "sections" or "subsections" - i.e., no sub-subsections, etc., but I think links between the relevant parts of the document will prevent any ambiguity.

9) In order to be thorough, I will consider a wide range of objections, whether actually raised by Christian philosophers or by other Christians, or even potential objections I think someone might raise.

I will, of course, consider all the main objections to arguments of this kind.

10) As usual, I don't claim that there is any novelty in the ideas on which I base this case.

1) Preliminary objections

In this section, I will address some objections that are or might be raised to any moral case against Christianity, prior to actually assessing the content of the particular objections.

1.1) Moral realism and theism

According to some theist philosophers, if theism is not true, then neither is moral realism.

I don't think that their arguments succeed, but there is no need to assess the claims here.

This is a case against Christianity, not against theism in general.

Moreover, since Christianity entails moral realism, we may safely assume moral realism when arguing against Christianity.

1.2) The Bible and the sources of moral knowledge

Someone might object that, without the Bible[2], we have no reliable source of moral knowledge, and so we cannot properly judge the actions of the biblical god.

This is not an objection I'd expect serious philosophers to raise, but I've seen some Christians making claims like this, so let's point out that:

1) Most people in most civilizations did not have the Bible.

If they did not have any reliable source of moral knowledge, how could the people in those civilizations be blamed for their actions?

How is was their fault that they, say, tortured or raped others, if they did not have any reliable means of telling right from wrong?

Moreover, can non-theists from today's predominantly non-Christian countries (e.g., China, Japan, Vietnam) be blamed for their actions?

Could Muslims who have not been exposed to Christianity be blamed for following the teachings of Islam - including those cases in which Islam and Christianity do not agree?

If those people can't be blamed for their actions, then they deserve no punishment at all - and surely, no afterlife punishment, either. But that contradicts most versions of Christianity.

2) In fact, most people today do not use the Bible as a source of moral beliefs, since most people today aren't Christians.

Again, if they have no reliable source of moral knowledge without the Bible, why should they adopt Christianity?

If there is no reliable source of moral knowledge without the Bible, then it seems they have no reliable way of assessing whether the Bible - rather than, say, the Quran - is a reliable source of moral knowledge. How would that be their fault?

3) In fact, if there is no reliable source of moral knowledge without the Bible, it seems plausible even without considering the Bible's content that the Bible won't provide any such source, either.
For, how would Christians know that the Bible is a reliable source of moral knowledge?

Even if they have good reasons to believe that it was inspired by a powerful being, that would not give them any reasons to believe that it was inspired by a morally good being.

And they can't reliably test whether the Bible contains moral truths unless they have another means - say, a sense of right and wrong - that can be used to make moral assessments, at least in a generally reliable way.

1.3) Sovereignty

Another objection might be that the creator is sovereign, and he has no moral obligations.

Thus, he wouldn't be acting immorally if he acted in some way - whatever that way is.

That, however, seems utterly implausible.

If there is a creator that is a moral agent, and he tortures everyone else for eternity just for fun, I think we could clearly say that such creator is acting immorally.

If, on the other hand, a creator is not a moral agent, then he's neither morally good nor morally bad nor morally anything, but then, Christianity is not true just because of that, since Christianity claims that, say, Jesus is morally good.

Someone might also claim that the biblical god is God, and he's not morally good in the usual sense of "morally good", but he's the source of goodness, and has no moral obligations himself.

I think this suggestion has a lot of problems, but let's simplify the matter:

If someone claims that religion X is true, and religion X claims that God tortures everyone else for eternity just for fun, we can safely conclude that religion X is not true because an entity who behaves in that way would not be God - since it would not be morally perfect.

And if religion Y claimed that God created the universe just for the fun of watching the "show" of limited sentient beings struggling, killing or being killed, etc., and does not care at all who or what suffers as long as he has fun, we would be able to tell that such a religion is not true, since a morally perfect being would not do that.

Similarly, then, one can properly make a case against Christianity based on the actions of the biblical god, as described in the Bible.

Of course, the biblical god does not torture everyone for eternity for fun - that would make the case too easy -, but that does not prevent us to assess his actions.

Granted, Christians will object to my assessments of the morality of the biblical god's actions, but that would require actually assessing the actions, not dismissing the whole moral case against Christianity merely on the basis of "sovereignty" - whatever that is.

1.4) Who are we to judge God?

Someone might raise the objection that we're morally flawed, so we shouldn't judge God.

Actually, if we know that an entity is God, we can easily judge his actions - and conclude that they're never immoral, since God is morally perfect.

However, I'm not making any claims about God, but making moral assessments of the actions of the biblical god, as described by the Bible.

1.5) Judging hypothetical characters

While this should go without saying, I've seen some odd objections, so I'd like to point out that we can easily - and correctly - make moral assessments about people in hypothetical scenarios, without being committed to the existence of the people in question.

For instance, we can say that something like "The fact that Lex Luthor did such-and-such thing shows that he's not morally good", and that would not normally be interpreted as a commitment to the existence of Lex Luthor.

Rather, we're just taking the perspective of the story, instead of stating something like "If Lex Luthor existed and had acted in such-and-such manner, then that would show that he wouldn't be morally good", which would be more cumbersome.

I will take a similar approach to the biblical god in many cases, but I'm in no way suggesting that he exists.

I'm not assuming that he does not exist, either.

Rather, the point is that we can make a moral assessment of his actions - as described by books Christianity holds are inspired -, regardless of whether or not he exists.

1.6) Our sense of right and wrong and Christianity

As I explained in previous subsections, we can use our sense of right and wrong to assess whether Christianity is true, by assessing the morality of some of the actions of the biblical god.

However, someone might claim that even if my sense of right and wrong tells me that the biblical god is not morally good - let alone morally perfect - their sense of right and wrong tells them otherwise.

Granted, that might happen, but we have to assess the matter carefully before concluding it does in a particular case.

For instance, there are plenty of examples in which some Christians seem to actually see moral problems in some of the actions of the biblical god, so they come up with some way of trying to explain it away.

For example, they might contend that people are in Hell by their own free choice, so it's not the fault of the biblical god. I maintain that such claims are untenable - i.e., people do not put themselves in Hell -, so the difference in moral assessments might result from that.

Still, if some Christians' sense of right and wrong actually yields a very different verdict from mine when assessing the morality of the actions of the biblical god that I will consider, and in particular they find no fault in his actions, then clearly they won't find the case I'm making persuasive at all.

All I would ask from readers is to try to assess the actions in question carefully, and reach their own conclusions.

1.7) The Fall

Another objection a Christian might raise against this moral case goes as follows: As a result of the Fall, we shouldn't trust our sense of right and wrong to make negative assessments about the moral character of the biblical god, or to conclude that he made false moral assessments.

A sufficient reply to that objection is as follows:

First, this objection seems to assume Christianity - including its moral claims.

But why should we assume that?

On the contrary, we're assessing whether Christianity is true, so assuming it would defeat the purpose of the assessment.

In fact, someone accepting this objection would be essentially refusing to use her moral sense as a means to assess whether Christianity is true - for every negative assessment would be rejected out of hand -, even if she claims that the biblical god is morally good, apparently accepting her moral sense in those cases in which it yields a positive assessment of the biblical god and his actions.

Once again, there is no good reason to refuse to use one's moral sense in this particular case, given that we can use it in general, to assess religious claims.

Second, if we shouldn't even trust our moral sense even when it yields crystal clear assessments[3], like, say, that oxen aren't moral agents, or that a woman in ancient Israel who became a prostitute and was the daughter of a priest, did not deserve to be burned to death for that, then that would cast such serious doubts on our moral sense that it would be hard to see how any moral assessment would be justified, given that we're rejecting even crystal clear ones.

The Bible would not help, of course, since we would not be able to assess that the biblical god is morally good, either, or that the Bible is a guide to moral truth.

1.8) The Old Testament and Christianity

Different versions of Christianity have different views about the relation between Christianity and the Old Testament, on issues ranging from whether some stories should be interpreted literally, to even whether the Old Testament is part of Christian scripture at all.

I will consider such matters later, but for now, I will just point out that versions of Christianity comprising most adherents seem to agree that even though many or all of the laws of the Old Testament do not apply to Christians, nevertheless they were laws given by the biblical god - who they claim is God - to the ancient Hebrews.

1.9) Hell and Christianity

As in the case of the Old Testament, different versions of Christianity have different views of Hell.

I will address different variants later, but for now, I will point out that versions of Christianity comprising most adherents hold that there is indeed endless suffering - even if they do not agree on its nature, who or what causes it, etc.

1.10) Context

In my experience, a more or less common objection to moral arguments against Christianity contends that biblical quotes are taken out of context, and that we should also consider those cases in which the biblical god does something that's clearly good.

According to this objection, if we were to take that into consideration, our conclusion would be that the biblical god is morally good, and that if some of his actions appear not to be so, it's because we don't have enough knowledge about the situation to make a better assessment.

However, with that criterion, someone might say that even if some of his actions appear to be morally good, that's only because we don't have enough information about the situation to conclude that they're not.

It seems to me that both claims would not be warranted: it seems we do have enough information to make a moral assessment of the actions of entities in hypothetical scenarios, in many cases, and the same applies to the biblical god.

In particular, if an action appears to be morally wrong, and all the possible reasons that we can come up with fail to provide a justification for said action, and further, there appear to be better alternatives - less bad, or even not bad -, then it seems clear that we're justified in assessing that such action would be morally wrong.

In addition to that, in some cases, we even know the biblical god's motivation - to punish people he claims deserve such punishment, for instance -, and so a claim that he acted for mysterious reasons appears to be untenable.

The same goes, of course, for morally good actions.
However, I don't think that it's in any way inappropriate not to also quote actions that appear to be morally good.

Objecting that I'm only focusing on the bad would be out of place: it would be like saying that if I said that a dictator who tortured people to death just for peacefully expressing disagreement with some of his policies acted immorally, I would be taking things out of context because the dictator in question, say, loved his children, and I did not point that out.

Well, maybe the dictator did love his children, but that does not change the fact that he acted very immorally when he tortured people to death just for peacefully expressing disagreement with some of his policies.

Given the extent of the immorality, my point that he's not morally good would be accurate.

Still, I will assess specific objections claiming that he may have had some particular good reason when required.

2) Immoral laws and false moral tenets in the Old Testament

In this section, I will consider a number of commands given by the biblical god in the Old Testament, which clearly show that the biblical god is not morally good.

Unless otherwise specified I will assume for the sake of the argument that the commands come from the biblical god. One can reasonably make this assumption in a moral case against Christianity, since the Bible is inspired according to Christianity, and the Bible actually claims that the commands were given by the biblical god.

In fact, the passages I will quote are, according to the Bible, either the words of the biblical god himself, or the words of Moses, conveying the commands of the biblical god.

Exodus 20: 22 And the LORD said unto Moses, Thus thou shalt say unto the children of Israel, Ye have seen that I have talked with you from heaven.

Exodus 21: 1 Now these are the judgments which thou shalt set before them.

Leviticus 20: 1 And the LORD spake unto Moses, saying,

Deuteronomy 1:

1 These be the words which Moses spake unto all Israel on this side Jordan in the wilderness, in the plain over against the Red sea, between Paran, and Tophel, and Laban, and Hazeroth, and Dizahab.

3 And it came to pass in the fortieth year, in the eleventh month, on the first day of the month, that Moses spake unto the children of Israel, according unto all that the LORD had given him in commandment unto them;

Deuteronomy 12:28 Observe and hear all these words which I command thee, that it may go well with thee, and with thy children after thee for ever, when thou doest that which is good and right in the sight of the LORD thy God.

Deuteronomy 13:18 When thou shalt hearken to the voice of the LORD thy God, to keep all his commandments which I command thee this day, to do that which is right in the eyes of the LORD thy God.

Deuteronomy 18:

15  The LORD thy God will raise up unto thee a Prophet from the midst of thee, of thy brethren, like unto me; unto him ye shall hearken;

16 According to all that thou desiredst of the LORD thy God in Horeb in the day of the assembly, saying, Let me not hear again the voice of the LORD my God, neither let me see this great fire any more, that I die not.

17 And the LORD said unto me, They have well spoken that which they have spoken.  

18 I will raise them up a Prophet from among their brethren, like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth; and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him.

19 And it shall come to pass, that whosoever will not hearken unto my words which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him.

I will later consider and objection to the claim that the passages under consideration are inspired.

2.1) Women stoned to death for having sex before marriage

Deuteronomy 22:

13 If any man take a wife, and go in unto her, and hate her,

14 And give occasions of speech against her, and bring up an evil name upon her, and say, I took this woman, and when I came to her, I found her not a maid:

15 Then shall the father of the damsel, and her mother, take and bring forth the tokens of the damsel's virginity unto the elders of the city in the gate:

16 And the damsel's father shall say unto the elders, I gave my daughter unto this man to wife, and he hateth her;

17 And, lo, he hath given occasions of speech against her, saying, I found not thy daughter a maid; and yet these are the tokens of my daughter's virginity. And they shall spread the cloth before the elders of the city.

18 And the elders of that city shall take that man and chastise him;

19 And they shall amerce him in an hundred shekels of silver, and give them unto the father of the damsel, because he hath brought up an evil name upon a virgin of Israel: and she shall be his wife; he may not put her away all his days.

20 But if this thing be true, and the tokens of virginity be not found for the damsel:

21 Then they shall bring out the damsel to the door of her father's house, and the men of her city shall stone her with stones that she die: because she hath wrought folly in Israel, to play the whore in her father's house: so shalt thou put evil away from among you.

So, the biblical god commanded that if a woman has sex and then gets married to someone who doesn't know she's not a virgin, she is to be stoned to death.

Moreover, the biblical god attempted to justify the punishment, implying that she deserved to be stoned to death because she had sex before marriage and then married someone who did not know that she wasn't a virgin, and apparently for prostituting herself at her father's house - which may not even be true.

However, it is clear that a woman does not deserve to be stoned to death for any of that. The same applies if the woman lived in ancient Israel.

So, the biblical god both gave immoral commands, and made false moral claims.[4]

Objection 2.1.1) The biblical god has sovereignty over life and death. He gives life, and he has the right to take it. He does no wrong by calling for the stoning of those women, and those following his orders do no wrong, either.

Reply:

First, there is no good reason to believe that he has the right to take someone's life just because he created that person.

Second, the biblical god is not saying that the non-virgin should be killed because he says so and he has the right to take any life if he says so.

Rather, he falsely claims that she deserves to be stoned to death as a punishment for her actions.

Third, this command does not "only" involve taking her life.

It's a command to torture her to death. She's not "only" to be killed; she's to be stoned to death.

Objection 2.1.2) She deserves to be stoned to death not for having sex before marriage at her father's house and then marrying someone who did not know, but for disobeying a morally perfect creator.

Reply:

First, that's not what the Bible says.

The Bible implies that she deserves such a punishment because she had sex before marriage and then married someone who did not know that she wasn't a virgin, and apparently for prostituting herself at her father's house - which may not even be true -, but not for disobeying a morally perfect creator.

Second, it should be obvious to a human being who is contemplating the matter rationally that a morally good or morally perfect entity would not command that a woman be stoned to death for having sex before marriage and then marrying someone who does not know that she wasn't a virgin, and/or for prostituting herself.

Third, actually, disobeying a morally perfect creator, on its own, does not merit being tortured to death.

Fourth, actually, there are plenty of violations of the biblical law that are not punished by death, let alone by torture to death.

One such case is provided by the very Bible passage under consideration: if a man falsely accuses his wife of not being a virgin when she marries him, he is not to be tortured to death.

Instead, he is to pay a fine.

Other versions of the Bible might include a more severe punishment for him than a fine[5], but nothing comparable to torture to death.

Moreover, there are plenty of cases in which biblical law - in any versions - establish punishments not involving either torture or death for those who break the law.

Objection 2.1.3) She deserves to be stoned to death not for having sex before marriage at her father's house and then marrying someone who did not know, but for disobeying a morally perfect creator in the particular case in which such a creator decides that the adequate punishment for breaking his rules is to be tortured to death.

Reply:

This objection is very similar to the previous one, and a similar reply applies:

First, that's not what the Bible says.

The Bible implies that she deserves such a punishment because she had sex before marriage and then married someone who did not know that she wasn't a virgin, and apparently for prostituting herself at her father's house - which may not even be true -, but not for disobeying a morally perfect creator.

Second, it should be obvious that a morally good or morally perfect entity would not command that a woman be stoned to death for having sex before marriage and then marrying someone who does not know that she wasn't a virgin, and/or for prostituting herself.

Third, actually, disobeying a morally perfect creator, on its own, does not merit being tortured to death.

Fourth, with that criterion, someone might posit a religion in which a morally perfect creator called "Todd" commands that those who, say, eats pork, be tortured to death, but those who rape or torture children for fun be forced to pay a small fine to the parents, and nothing more.

The point is that a morally perfect creator would not command either what Todd commands in that example, or what the biblical god commanded in the biblical story under consideration, and claiming that the commanding entity is morally perfect is not a rational way of trying to excuse his actions.

Objection 2.1.4) That command has to be considered in context, and the context is given by the biblical god's covenant with Israel.

Reply:

Let's take a look at the matter:

The biblical god made a pact with some of the leaders of Israel.

He agreed to provide some kind of assistance in terms of food supplies, sometimes military help, etc., and on the other hand he commanded that they torture to death any woman who has premarital sex at her father's house, and then gets married to someone who does not know that she's not a virgin.

Even if the biblical god always did as agreed, it should once again be obvious that that would not excuse his actions:

He just agreed to provide some help with food and fighting, and then demanded that some women be tortured to death, even though they obviously did not deserve that.

On top of that, he actually lied, by implying that they deserved to be stoned to death.

So, the covenant does not alter the assessment of his actions as immoral.

Objection 2.1.5) The biblical god realized that the command under consideration, alongside other harsh commands, was required to keep social peace among the ancient Hebrews, who weren't ready for a better law. Their hearts were hard.

Reply:

First, this command wasn't merely "harsh"; it was profoundly unjust. It was a command to stone women to death if they had sex before marriage and then married someone who didn't know they weren't virgins.

Second, the biblical god also lied by implying that they deserved to be stoned to death.

Third, the biblical god is an entity of immense power, capable of and willing to intervene in the history of Israel on many occasions.

Obviously, he could have pointed out that those women did not deserve to be stoned to death, instead of falsely claiming that they did and then commanding that they be stoned.

No social breakdown would have followed from refraining from making false moral claims and from issuing a profoundly unjust command.

What would the ancient Hebrews have done, if he had not lied and had not commanded that they be stoned to death?

Rebel against an all-powerful being because he does not command them to stone women to death for having premarital sex and then marrying someone who does not know that they did?

Should we believe that his commands would only be obeyed by most of the population if they were in line with what the people he's giving commands to already wanted?

What kind of command is that?

That seems absurd.

And if some of them absurdly would have rebelled against an all-powerful being for that, then so be it. The potential absurd rebellion of some of the people who wanted to stone to death any woman who had sex before marriage and then married someone who didn't know she wasn't a virgin, does not justify giving the command that those evil people wanted.

In short: if some evil people would only "follow" certain evil commands, that does not justify giving them the evil "commands" that they want, and on top of that telling them or implying that their actions were actually just.

So, this objection is also unreasonable.

However, even if - against all reason - we assume that there was some justification for calling for the execution of those women, the biblical god could have always commanded that they be killed in a way the minimizes suffering; furthermore, he could have refrained from falsely implying that they deserved to be stoned to death.

Instead, he commanded that they be tortured to death by means of stoning - again, not that it would be reasonable to assume that there was some justification for calling for that execution -, and made false moral claims against them.

Objection 2.1.6) Those passages are allegorical. They should not be taken literally.

Reply:

Those are commands, and moral claims. How can they be an allegory?

In any case, there is nothing whatsoever in the text indicating that those passages weren't literal.

If the biblical god issued commands and made moral claims, he should have expected that they would be taken literally, since that's how commands and moral claims are usually taken, and that's how his commands and moral claims were usually taken.

So, if he did not mean for them to be taken literally, he should have clarified that.

Furthermore, if he made a mistake and expected the claims and commands not to be taken literally, then when they were so taken - as any reasonable person would take them -, and the claims were believed and the commands followed - not reasonable anymore -, then the biblical god should have clarified that there had been a misunderstanding.

He did not, so that would be on him even if he hadn't meant for them to be taken literally - though, again, it seems clear that he did.

Objection 2.1.7) If the biblical god wanted those harsh laws to be enacted, then why did Jesus later chose to spare the adulterer?

Reply:

Stepping out of the story for a moment, it seems that whoever wrote that story about Jesus had a different agenda from whoever wrote the part of the Old Testament under consideration, and probably very different moral beliefs on the subject.

If the story about Jesus' sparing a woman who had committed adultery is true, then Jesus too had a different agenda from whoever wrote Deuteronomy, and probably very different moral beliefs as well.

But leaving that aside and going back to the events as described in the Bible - and also leaving aside that the particular command under consideration is not about adultery, but women who have premarital sex, at least under certain circumstances -, we can point out that:

a) The laws aren't just harsh, but profoundly unjust,

b) Whatever the reasons for the biblical god's later change of heart, that does not excuse his previous commands and lies, and,

c) Some deeds of the biblical god described in the New Testament do not appear to be better than any of those described in the Old Testament; in fact, some of them are even a lot more evil if the interpretation that there is infinite hell is correct.

But that's a matter for a later section.

Objection 2.1.8) Those laws applied only to the Hebrews, but do not apply after Jesus.

Reply:

That's beside the point.

It remains the case that the biblical god gave immoral commands and made false moral claims, even if he only gave such commands to some people, and only made such claims before some people.

Objection 2.1.9) Those passages are not inspired. That wasn't the law given by Jesus' father, but a law made by humans.

Reply:

Then, why is it the case that nearly all versions of Christianity today consider them to be inspired?

Why did Jesus himself not point out that those laws were not the work of his father?

In fact, what Jesus said was:

Luke 16:

16 The law and the prophets were until John: since that time the kingdom of God is preached, and every man presseth into it.

17 And it is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail.

Matthew 5:17 Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil.

So, regardless the obscurity about what exactly he's going to change, it is apparent that he acknowledges the law as originating in the biblical god.

Objection 2.1.10) The biblical god is justified because he's warning his people not to do evil.

Reply:

He's saying that a woman who had premarital sex and then married someone who did not know deserves to be stoned to death, and is commanding that they actually stone her to death.

That cannot be excused as "warning his people not to do evil": he's making false moral claims and issuing immoral commands.

Objection 2.1.11) You're just making an emotional appeal. You have no basis for claiming that the actions of the biblical god are immoral, or that the claims he made are false.

Reply:

Actually, I'm appealing to people's sense of right and wrong, which is what moral arguments are based on, ultimately.

In fact, even many Christians agree with the moral assessment I'm making - namely, that the command is appalling, and that the implication that they deserve that punishment is not true -, which is why they claim that the passages are not inspired.

As I explained above, that objection fails as well, but they do raise it because they agree that a being that behaves in the way the biblical god's behavior is described in this case, would not be morally good.

That aside, it's true that someone might insist that their moral sense is in fact different, and that it tells them that stoning a woman to death for having premarital sex and then marrying someone who didn't know that, was morally acceptable in ancient Israel, and that she deserved to be stoned to death. Those people won't be persuaded by this example, and probably not by this full moral case, either.

However, that does not mean that somehow my argument can be dismissed as an "emotional appeal" because it appeals to the readers' sense of right and wrong.

Furthermore, with that criterion, someone might dismiss any moral case as an "emotional appeal", since ultimately all of them do appeal to the reader's sense of right and wrong, even if implicitly.

Objection 2.1.12) If stoning a woman to death for having sex before marriage and then marrying someone who does not know were so clearly immoral in the social context of the ancient Hebrews, the ancient Hebrews would have realized that. However, they actually embraced the law, because they saw it was good. It's your sense of right and wrong that is giving you the wrong result, maybe because you're not considering the social context, or for some other reason.

Reply:

This kind of objection could be raised pretty much against any moral argument when the person making the assessment is not in the social context in which the events take place, and the people in the given context disagree. The ancient Hebrews are no exception in that regard.

It's not generally a good objection, and it fails in this case too.

But let's consider a few cases to see why:

It is clear to a human being who is contemplating the matter carefully and rationally that, say, people who stop believing that Islam is true do not deserve to be decapitated for that.

It appears that it's not at all apparent to many people in places such as Saudi Arabia, including those making the laws.

So, many, perhaps most living in that context fail to see it.

Perhaps, that's because some beliefs to which they have strong emotional attachments get in the way, and/or they haven't even considered the matter - it depends on the person -, but it is clear that people who leave Islam do not deserve to be killed for that even in the social contexts in which they're killed for that - and we don't need to be part of that context to make that assessment.

It is clear to a human being who is contemplating the matter carefully and rationally that, say, a woman who has sex before getting married, or who refuses to marry a person chosen by her father, does not deserve to be killed for that, or to have her face disfigured with acid for that, even if the acid attack happens in a social context in which such acid attacks are common, and even if they are believed to be morally right by most of the people living in those social groups.

However, many people around the world fail to realize that.

It is clear that a human woman who has sex before marriage - today or in ancient Israel, or in any other society - does not deserve to be stoned to death for that.

Well, it's clear to a human being who is contemplating the matter carefully and rationally.

It was not clear to ancient Hebrew lawmakers, and perhaps to most of the ancient Hebrews, and also to many other people in the past, in different societies.

Generally, people who live in brutal social environments usually do not dedicate time to ponder whether their laws are just, and when they do, they usually do so looking to the tainted lens of false beliefs that they're emotionally attached to, and/or otherwise irrationally.

There are of course, exceptions, which contributes to moral progress.

Also, progress in living conditions results in more people assessing these matters rationally, and not make up or approve of laws that are as immoral as the ones under consideration. That also contributes to moral progress.

Now, let's assess the claim:

P: An ancient Hebrew woman who had sex before marriage and then married someone who did not know that she was not a virgin, deserved to be stoned to death.

It should be obvious that the claim is not true, and that stoning her was immoral.

Readers of course can use their own sense of right and wrong to make an assessment.

That is rational.

What would not be rational would be to say - for instance - "but God claimed or implied that she deserved it, and God is morally perfect and not a liar, so the claim was true, and it was not immoral to stone her."

That would amount to essentially refuse to assess the claim by one's moral sense, and instead conclude that she deserved to be stoned to death and that stoning her was not immoral because of a baseless assumption that God made the claim that she deserved it and/or commanded that she be stoned.

There is no problem assuming for the sake of the argument that the biblical god claimed or implied that she deserved to be stoned to death, and commanded that she be stoned to death.

However, when assessing the moral character of the biblical god, it would not be rational to assume that the biblical god is actually God. That would not be an assessment at all, but simply a baseless assumption of moral perfection.

The same goes for other commands and claims I will address in later subsections, including some probably even worse than this one - some that involve burning people to death.

So, I'm making a moral case in the sense people usually make moral arguments - at least, when they're being rational about it.

If a reader's moral sense truly tells her that a woman who lived in ancient Israel and who had sex before marriage and then married someone who did not know deserved to be stoned to death, then guess I will not persuade that person - at least, not with this particular example.

As before, I would only ask readers to please use their own sense of right and wrong to assess the matter, rather than, say, assume that the biblical god is morally good, or that Jesus is, and that Jesus approved, etc.

2.2.) Women and men burned to death for getting into an outlawed kind of marriage

Leviticus 20:14 And if a man take a wife and her mother, it is wickedness: they shall be burnt with fire, both he and they; that there be no wickedness among you.

So, it seems that if a man marries a woman and her mother, the biblical god commands the three of them be burned to death - a form of torture to death at least as bad as stoning, and probably even worse.

Moreover, he justifies this by claiming that those people are wicked, and that in that way, wickedness is removed from among the ancient Hebrews.

What he does not point out that burning people to death for entering a type of illegal marriage is indeed wicked, whereas entering that kind of marriage does not appear to be so - but even if there were something wrong with entering that kind of marriage, it surely does not compare with burning people do death for doing so.

As for objections, they're essentially the same as in the previous subsection, and are handled in the same manner.

2.3) Women burned to death for prostitution

Leviticus 21:9 And the daughter of any priest, if she profane herself by playing the whore, she profaneth her father: she shall be burnt with fire.

Once again, the biblical god gives the appalling command to burn a woman to death for being a prostitute, if her father happens to be a priest.

There is also an implicit claim that she deserves it because she "profaneth her father".

No further comment is needed here; it should be obvious at this point that the biblical god is a monster. [5]

Objections are handled as before.

2.4) Men executed for having sex with other men

Leviticus 20:13 If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them.

In this particular case, the method of execution is not specified.

However, execution itself would be bad enough; moreover, while the method is not specified, if the biblical god did not want men who have sex with men to be tortured to death but "just" executed, then it was his responsibility to say so.

That's because the methods of execution usually in place were forms of torture to death, and that includes the methods he commanded in other cases - such as stoning people to death, and burning people to death.

Moreover, given that he did not object to the use of the same brutal methods in this case as well - despite his usual interventions giving laws and the like - it seems reasonable to conclude that he at the very least approve of such methods.

Most of the objections are the same as before, and so they're similarly handled, but there are a few other objections to be briefly considered.

Objection 2.4.1) The punishment was death, not necessarily by stoning or any other painful method.

Reply:

First, as I just explained, that would be bad enough; moreover, it seems that the biblical god at least approved of a particularly painful method in this case too.

Second, the biblical god not "only" commands that they be put to death, but he implies that they deserve it, which is not true.

Objection 2.4.2) That command was only for cases of rape, not for all cases of homosexual sex between men.

Reply:

The command is that they both be killed.

Objection 2.4.3) That command was only for cases of male prostitution, or maybe for some cases of ritualistic homosexual intercourse, not for all cases of homosexual sex between men.

Reply:

Regardless, they still didn't deserve to be put to death by any means, nor to be tortured to death by the means used by the ancient Hebrews.

Objection 2.4.4) The command is justified to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted illnesses.

Reply:

A command by the creator of all sexually transmitted illnesses to execute men for having sex with other men in order to prevent the spread of such illnesses appears to be clearly unjust.
The biblical god could have just stopped the illnesses all by himself - or merely refrain from causing them.

That aside, there was no claim that it was to prevent STDs that the killing was carried out.

Rather, the biblical god claimed that they deserved it, which is not true, and without saying a word about STDs.

Even leaving all of that aside, killing people to reduce the risk of transmission of any of the STDs that afflicted the ancient Hebrews is still immoral.

2.5) Women and non-human animals executed for having inter-species sex

Leviticus 20:16 And if a woman approach unto any beast, and lie down thereto, thou shalt kill the woman, and the beast: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them.

In addition to the usual unjust commands and false moral claims, in this particular case the biblical god accuses any non-human animal for the "crime" of having sex with a woman, claiming that their blood "shall be upon them".

It's not that the woman deserves to be killed, of course - objections are handled as in previous cases, mutatis mutandi, so I will not repeated them for the sake of brevity -, or that this case is any worse than the others.

However, I mention this case because curiously, the biblical god is accusing an entity that is not even a moral agent[7] of acting immorally.

Objection 2.5.1) The non-human animals were possessed by demons, who deserved the punishment for having sex with women.  [8]

Reply:

First, that is not what the Bible says.

If the biblical god meant to say that this command only applied to possessed non-human animals, he should have said so in order to be understood.

Instead, the command - and the moral claim "their blood shall be upon them" - applies to any woman, and any non-human animal she may choose to have sex with - and she doesn't have to pick one that is possessed.

Second, this command is actually in line with a tendency to fail to realize that some beings aren't moral beings, and punish them; I will provide another example in the next subsection.

Third, if he wanted to kill demons possessing non-human animals, the biblical god could simply do it himself, leaving the non-human animal alone; furthermore, there is no suggestion that a demon can be killed by the ancient Hebrews and their methods for killing non-human animals.

Fourth, a woman does not deserve to be put to death for having sex with a non-human animal, so the command would still be immoral, and the claim false.

2.6) Oxen stoned to death as a punishment

Exodus 21:28 If an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit.

Exodus 21:32 If the ox shall push a manservant or a maidservant; he shall give unto their master thirty shekels of silver, and the ox shall be stoned.

While killing a dangerous animal is acceptable, those are clearly not just commands to kill a dangerous ox.

Rather, the ox is punished for his actions by being tortured to death by stoning.

In brief:

a) Killing the ox because he's dangerous would probably have been acceptable in context.

b) Killing the ox by stoning him to death because he was dangerous would have been unacceptable. There were clearly more humane ways of killing the ox, which were not more costly.

c) Killing the ox by stoning him to death because of a belief that he deserved to be stoned to death as a punishment was an unacceptable behavior resulting from a serious moral confusion.

Yet, commanding that the ox be put to death by stoning was a way of implicitly saying that the ox deserved it. But he did not deserve it: the ox was just an ox.

So, in addition to cruelty against non-human animals, here the biblical god is implying that oxen who behaved in that manner were acting evilly, and deserved to be tortured to death for their actions.

So, he was implicitly making a false moral statement.

Objection 2.6.1) The oxen were possessed by demons, who deserved the punishment for attacking humans.  [8]

Reply:

That is not what the Bible says, or how it was interpreted.

If the biblical god meant to say that this command only applied to possessed oxen, he should have said so in order to be understood.

But he did not, so the command applied to any ox, and even in the story, there is no good reason to believe that any ox that gores a human was possessed.

Objection 2.6.2) There was no implication that the ox deserved it. Stoning the ox to death was simply the procedure for killing him. Before animal rights activists brought confusion, there was no moral outrage at killing an animal.

Reply:

First, stoning was used as a method of punishment in ancient Israel. It was not a normal procedure for killing oxen. So, there was an implicit moral condemnation of the ox for his actions.

Second, it's true that there was no moral outrage at killing an ox, and often there is no such outrage today.

However, those ancient Hebrews were morally outraged because of the actions of the ox, which they believed was morally responsible and which they stoned to death as a punishment. That's deeply confused, and the biblical god was deeply confused too - or deceiving those ancient Hebrews.

Third, one does not need to be an animal rights activist to recognize that killing an ox by stoning him to death when there are faster, less painful and no more costly methods, is unacceptable because it's unnecessarily cruel.

Still, even assuming that unnecessary cruelty towards oxen is not immoral - or was not immoral in the context of ancient Israel -, the fact remains that the oxen in question did not deserve to be stoned to death.

2.7) An assortment of more immoral commands and false moral claims

Just to add some more evidence, I will quote a number of other immoral commands issued and/or false moral claims made by the biblical god.

Num 15

32 And while the children of Israel were in the wilderness, they found a man that gathered sticks upon the sabbath day.

33 And they that found him gathering sticks brought him unto Moses and Aaron, and unto all the congregation.

34 And they put him in ward, because it was not declared what should be done to him.

35 And the LORD said unto Moses, The man shall be surely put to death: all the congregation shall stone him with stones without the camp.

36 And all the congregation brought him without the camp, and stoned him with stones, and he died.

Leviticus 20:27  A man also or woman that hath a familiar spirit, or that is a wizard, shall surely be put to death: they shall stone them with stones: their blood shall be upon them.

Leviticus 24:16 And he that blasphemeth the name of the LORD, he shall surely be put to death, and all the congregation shall certainly stone him: as well the stranger, as he that is born in the land, when he blasphemeth the name of the Lord, shall be put to death.

Deuteronomy 22:23-24 If a damsel that is a virgin be betrothed unto an husband, and a man find her in the city, and lie with her.

Then ye shall bring them both out unto the gate of that city, and ye shall stone them with stones that they die; the damsel, because she cried not, being in the city; and the man, because he hath humbled his neighbour's wife: so thou shalt put away evil from among you.

Deuteronomy 25:11-12 When men strive together one with another, and the wife of the one draweth near for to deliver her husband out of the hand of him that smiteth him, and putteth forth her hand, and taketh him by the secrets

Then thou shalt cut off her hand, thine eye shall not pity her.

For the sake of brevity, I will not add more commands and claims, but many other examples of evil commands and false moral claims can easily be found in the Bible.

So, in brief, the biblical god made or implied a number of false moral claims; for example, he claimed or implied that, in ancient Israel:

a) If a man marries two women, and they're mother and daughter, then the three of them deserve to be burned to death.

b) If a woman has premarital sex, she deserves to be stoned to death - at least, if she then marries someone who does not know it.

c) If a woman is the daughter of a priest and she is also a prostitute, she deserves to be burned to death.

d) If a woman is betrothed to a man, but has sex with another man, then she and her lover deserve to be stoned to death.

e) If a woman has sex with a non-human animal, both the woman and the non-human animal deserve to be killed.

In addition to those claims or implications, the biblical god gave the corresponding commands.

In other words, he commanded the ancient Hebrews to stone to death, burn to death, kill, etc., all the people and non-human animals in question.

Objection 2.7.1) You're taking things out of context. You should consider Jesus' life, and see that he was morally good. Then, if some passages in the Old Testament appear problematic, you should realize that the biblical god knows better than you do, and that once we've established - based on Jesus' life, and/or other actions of the biblical god described in the Old Testament -, that he is morally good, we can conclude that the biblical god had good reasons for giving those commands.

Reply:

That would be an irrational way of assessing the moral character of the biblical god: essentially, that would amount to arbitrarily picking some of the actions described in the Bible, "conclude" from them that a being is morally good, and then claim that he must have had mysterious reasons for the others.

However, just as we can use our sense of right and wrong to assess that some of his actions were not immoral, we can use it to assess that some of his actions were profoundly evil.

Also, it's important to point out that it's not the case that we don't have sufficient information to make an assessment in the cases of the Old Testament under consideration: assuming the description in the biblical story - as usual -, we have the commands the biblical god gave, and the reasons he used by him to attempt to justify them, including moral claims that are false, and we can ascertain that they're false by means of using our own sense of right and wrong, and assessing potential reasons and objections, as I've been doing so far - which is precisely the same way in which we can assess that some of Jesus' actions are morally good.

The good actions, however, do not make him not evil, just as a dictator who tortures political opponents to death just for speaking out against some of his policies is morally bad, even if he is kind to his children, and even if he is good towards millions of people in the country he rules over.

Objection 2.7.2) In the case of the biblical god, the interpretation that he is evil even though sometimes he (and/or his son) did the right thing, does not make sense, since it would make no sense for a person to be so good sometimes and so bad some other times. No person would act like that, unless he's insane, and he does not appear to be so.

Reply:

First, leaving aside the biblical story for a moment, the people who wrote the passages of the Old Testament under consideration had very different moral beliefs and agendas from those writing the New Testament; further, different writers of the Old Testament had very different beliefs and agendas, and the same goes for different writers of the New Testament.

So, any unusual feature in the character in the biblical god would be unsurprising given the real, historical context.

Still, this is a moral case that does not require any assessments of existence, so let's consider the matter assuming the events described in the Bible:

Second, actually, if - but it's a big "if" - any entity that does as much evil as I claim the biblical god does in the events described in the Old Testament, and also does the amount of good that biblical god does in both the New and the Old Testament (how much good he does is very debatable, though), is insane, then the proper conclusion would not be that the biblical god does no evil, since the points I made earlier showing that he does evil are unaffected by that consideration.

Rather, the proper conclusion would be that the biblical god is indeed insane, even if, at some times, his mind goes back to some kind of normalcy, or even if that normalcy is the most common situations, and he only loses his mind in specific episodes.

Third, even if it's true that a human who behaves in such a manner is insane, it's not clear that we can extend that assessment of mental illness to all other intelligent species, or to all non-human intelligent entities with minds very different from human minds and who don't belong to any species.

So, I do not know that an assessment that the biblical god is insane would be warranted. On the other hand, an assessment that he's evil is, for the reasons I've been explaining.

Fourth, in the case of humans, there are plenty of people, in the past and today, who do both a lot of evil and a good number of good deeds, often try to do what's right, and usually believe themselves to be morally good, or mostly so.

For instance, many law-enforcement agents, judges, and rulers in all kinds of oppressive regimes, and/or brutal political and social environments, often justly arrest and/or punish murderers, terrorists, rapists, bank robbers, thieves in general, con artists, etc.

Sometimes they impose reasonable penalties - not always, of course, but it's not difficult to find examples of crimes in which the penalties are reasonable.

Some other times they impose immorally severe penalties, or immorally punish people who shouldn't be punished at all, like peaceful political opponents whose only "crime" was to speak out, apostates, or people who have same-gender sex.

The amount of evil that people in the previous category do or did is widely variable - both among cultures and individuals -, and examples abound, both from the present (e.g., Cuba, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia), and the past (e.g., the Soviet Union, the Aztecs, the Roman Empire, Mao's China, Europe in the Middle Ages, and - of course - the ancient Hebrews).

Moreover, that kind of punishments - both the good and the bad - were often supported by most of the population.

It's not clear at all that all of those people were or are insane - it's not even plausible to think they were.

Even if we restrict ourselves to cases of religiously driven brutality, like the ancient Hebrews, or the Aztecs, it's rather implausible to think they were all or mostly insane.

However, if they are/were, that would only mean that insanity is a very common feature of humans, but it makes no impact on the moral assessment of the actions of the biblical god.

Fifth - and as a side comment - in many cases, the people described above believed in some entities who happened to have some of their own flaws and strengths, often considerably magnified.

In particular, the ancient Hebrews believed in the biblical god.

An obvious interpretation is that the biblical god and his actions were just imagined by some of the ancient Hebrews, and his character reflects both the good and the bad in the customs of those people, perhaps exaggerating some features, which makes him particularly evil.

Later, some other people wrote about Jesus, and yet some other people put together the stories and identified Jesus with the biblical god, perhaps making the character somewhat more alien.

Objection 2.7.3) The biblical god is justified because he's warning his people not to do evil.

Reply:

He's making many false moral claims, and giving many immoral commands. The actions for which people were to be burned to death, stoned to death, etc., are not actions for which they deserved anything like that.

Even if we assume for the sake of the argument that all of the actions for which people are being burned to death, stoned to death, etc., were indeed immoral - an implausible assumption, but let's let that pass -, the biblical god would have been "warning" them not to do those particular immoral actions...by falsely claiming or implying that those involved in said actions deserved to be stoned to death, burned to death, etc., for those actions, and by commanding others to carry out far more immoral actions, like torturing those people to death - people who obviously did not deserve it.

Moreover, the biblical god even falsely claimed or implied that even the non-human animals involved in some of those actions deserved to be killed, stoned to death, etc., and gave the command to impose those punishments to those non-human animals. Who was he warning, then? Oxen? Rams, perhaps?

The fact is that the code gave by the biblical god to the ancient Hebrews is full of evil commands, false moral claims and outright absurdities.

Stepping out of the story for a moment, that's not surprising, given that this code was invented by an ancient group of humans who were considerably ignorant, and sometimes extremely brutal.

But assuming that these were the commands given by the biblical god, he was clearly evil.

And assuming that they weren't, then Jesus was mistaken by believing they were, and so Christianity is not true either way.

2.8) The hardness of the hearts of the ancient Hebrews

Earlier in this section, when addressing the case of women who were stoned to death for having premarital sex, I considered the "hard hearts" objection, showing why the objection fails to excuse the biblical god's actions.

In this subsection, I will address it again in greater detail:

The basic idea is that Jesus' claim in the case of divorce also extends to other dispositions of the law given by the biblical god to the ancient Hebrews:

Mark 10

2 And the Pharisees came to him, and asked him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife? tempting him.

3 And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you?
4 And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement, and to put her away.
5 And Jesus answered and said unto them, For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept.
6 But from the beginning of the creation God made them male and female.
7 For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife;
8 And they twain shall be one flesh: so then they are no more twain, but one flesh.
9 What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.

So, according to this objection, the laws I addressed before were given to the ancient Hebrews because of the hardness of their hearts, but we should not conclude that the biblical god actually believed that it was morally acceptable to, say, burn a woman to death because she was the daughter of a priest and a prostitute, or stoning her to death because she had premarital sex and then married someone who did not know that.

This objection, however, fails to excuse the actions of the biblical god for - at least - the following reasons:

First, the biblical god commanded the ancient Hebrews to engage in those heinous acts of torture to death by burning or stoning people to death - among other atrocities.

How would the "hardness" of their hearts excuse giving them the order to commit such atrocities.

Second, the biblical god clearly implied that the people to be burned, stoned, killed etc., and even the non-human animals to be punished, deserved to be so punished.

That's apparent given that he commanded all of that while claiming or implying that he was good.

Alternatively, one can easily see that he implied that they deserved to be punished in that way by considering the specific wording of most of the commands; for instance:

Deuteronomy 22: 21 Then they shall bring out the damsel to the door of her father's house, and the men of her city shall stone her with stones that she die: because she hath wrought folly in Israel, to play the whore in her father's house: so shalt thou put evil away from among you.

Here, he claim is that they shall stone her because she hath wrought folly in Israel, implicitly saying that she deserves to be stoned to death because of her actions.

Leviticus 20:27  A man also or woman that hath a familiar spirit, or that is a wizard, shall surely be put to death: they shall stone them with stones: their blood shall be upon them.

In this case, the biblical god claims that their blood shall be upon them, which is a way of implying that they deserve to be punished in the prescribed way.

Leviticus 21:9 And the daughter of any priest, if she profane herself by playing the whore, she profaneth her father: she shall be burnt with fire.

In this case, there is also an attempted justification for the command: "she profaneth her father" - and implicitly, that's why she allegedly deserves to burn with fire. 

Leviticus 20:16 And if a woman approach unto any beast, and lie down thereto, thou shalt kill the woman, and the beast: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them.

Once again, here the claim is that "their blood shall be upon them", implying that both the woman and the non-human animal that had sex with her - regardless of species - deserved to be put to death.

Leviticus 20:13 If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon them.

As in previous cases, the biblical god claims is that their blood shall be upon them.

So, it's clear that the biblical god did claim or implied that they deserved to be punished in the prescribed manner, and that it wasn't immoral to inflict that punishment on them.

Third, regardless of whether their hearts were hard or not, the biblical god was far more powerful, and was giving them a law, sometimes making threats and taking direct action to coerce them into following it.

So, he clearly could have made things much better if he had refrained from issuing evil commands and from making false moral claims.

In fact, by giving evil commands and making false moral claims, he was reinforcing their immoral practices and beliefs, and the "hardness" of their hearts.[9]

Fourth, Jesus himself believed that the law was good, going by the biblical story:

Luke 16:

6 The law and the prophets were until John: since that time the kingdom of God is preached, and every man presseth into it.

17 And it is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail.

Matthew 5:17 Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil.

Unless Jesus was lying, it seems that when he claimed that, he believed that following the law was not morally wrong.

3) David's murder of Uriah, and the biblical god's immoral reaction

According to the Bible, David had sex with Uriah's wife, Bathsheba, and then had Uriah killed.

The biblical god punished David for that.

The problem is how the biblical god punished him:

2 Samuel 11:

1. And it came to pass, after the year was expired, at the time when kings go forth to battle, that David sent Joab, and his servants with him, and all Israel; and they destroyed the children of Ammon, and besieged Rabbah. But David tarried still at Jerusalem.  

2. And it came to pass in an eveningtide, that David arose from off his bed, and walked upon the roof of the king's house: and from the roof he saw a woman washing herself; and the woman was very beautiful to look upon.  

3. And David sent and enquired after the woman. And one said, Is not this Bathsheba, the daughter of Eliam, the wife of Uriah the Hittite?

4.And David sent messengers, and took her; and she came in unto him, and he lay with her; for she was purified from her uncleanness: and she returned unto her house.

 5. And the woman conceived, and sent and told David, and said, I am with child.

 6. And David sent to Joab, saying, Send me Uriah the Hittite. And Joab sent Uriah to David.

 7. And when Uriah was come unto him, David demanded of him how Joab did, and how the people did, and how the war prospered.  

8. And David said to Uriah, Go down to thy house, and wash thy feet. And Uriah departed out of the king's house, and there followed him a mess of meat from the king.  

9. But Uriah slept at the door of the king's house with all the servants of his lord, and went not down to his house.  

10. And when they had told David, saying, Uriah went not down unto his house, David said unto Uriah, Camest thou not from thy journey? why then didst thou not go down unto thine house?  

11. And Uriah said unto David, The ark, and Israel, and Judah, abide in tents; and my lord Joab, and the servants of my lord, are encamped in the open fields; shall I then go into mine house, to eat and to drink, and to lie with my wife? as thou livest, and as thy soul liveth, I will not do this thing.  

12. And David said to Uriah, Tarry here to day also, and to morrow I will let thee depart. So Uriah abode in Jerusalem that day, and the morrow.

13. And when David had called him, he did eat and drink before him; and he made him drunk: and at even he went out to lie on his bed with the servants of his lord, but went not down to his house.  

14. And it came to pass in the morning, that David wrote a letter to Joab, and sent it by the hand of Uriah.  

15. And he wrote in the letter, saying, Set ye Uriah in the forefront of the hottest battle, and retire ye from him, that he may be smitten, and die.  

16. And it came to pass, when Joab observed the city, that he assigned Uriah unto a place where he knew that valiant men were.  

17. And the men of the city went out, and fought with Joab: and there fell some of the people of the servants of David; and Uriah the Hittite died also.

...

26. And when the wife of Uriah heard that Uriah her husband was dead, she mourned for her husband.

27. And when the mourning was past, David sent and fetched her to his house, and she became his wife, and bare him a son. But the thing that David had done displeased the LORD.

So, the biblical god was displeased with David's treacherous and murderous actions. Let's see how he punished David:

2 Samuel 11:

11. Thus saith the LORD, Behold, I will raise up evil against thee out of thine own house, and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbour, and he shall lie with thy wives in the sight of this sun.

12. For thou didst it secretly: but I will do this thing before all Israel, and before the sun.

So, David's wives - completely non-guilty in this matter - are going to be "given" to David's neighbor, to be raped if they don't feel like having sex with him - their consent is not required.

But there is more:

2 Samuel 11:

14. Howbeit, because by this deed thou hast given great occasion to the enemies of the LORD to blaspheme, the child also that is born unto thee shall surely die.

15. And Nathan departed unto his house. And the LORD struck the child that Uriah's wife bare unto David, and it was very sick.  

16. David therefore besought God for the child; and David fasted, and went in, and lay all night upon the earth.  

17. And the elders of his house arose, and went to him, to raise him up from the earth: but he would not, neither did he eat bread with them.

18. And it came to pass on the seventh day, that the child died...

So, the biblical god decided to target someone else: David and Bathsheba's son was slowly killed by the biblical god, who caused him to be very sick for a week, and then die.

The biblical god's actions speak for themselves, so no further comment is needed.

Objection 3.1) The biblical god has sovereignty over life and death. He gives life, and he has the right to take it. He does no wrong by killing David and Bathsheba's son.

Reply:

First, there is no good reason to believe that he has the right to take someone's life just because he created that person.

Second, in any event, the biblical god is not "only" killing the child. He's making him very sick, with an illness that kills him in a week.

Someone might suggest that, perhaps, the child was always unconscious and suffered no pain, but there is no good reason to assume so.

Third, even if we leave the child aside, that would not excuse the biblical god's decision to have David's wives raped by David's neighbor.

Objection 3.2) That passage was an allegory. Those events never happened. The biblical god was teaching the ancient Hebrews a moral lesson against adultery and murder.

Reply:

Then, the biblical god inspired a story making David look like a murderer, and making himself look like a rapist, a torturer and a murderer, and when the story wasn't interpreted allegorically, the biblical god didn't object to that, further confusing the ancient Hebrews who read those stories.

Objection 3.3) David's actions are a historical account. Only the actions of the biblical god are allegorical.

Reply:

That appears to be picking and choosing.

But leaving that aside, the fact would still be that the biblical god inspired a story making himself look like a rapist, a torturer and a murderer, and when the story wasn't interpreted allegorically, the biblical god didn't object to that, further confusing the ancient Hebrews who read those stories.

Objection 3.4) Those passages are not inspired. They're not scriptural. They should be removed from the Bible.

Reply:

If so, then why didn't Jesus say so?

Why did he not correct that error?

Why did he not remove those passages portraying his father as a monster?

In fact, given that Jesus believed that the law of the Old Testament came from the biblical god, then clearly he did not oppose to the atrocities in that law.

The fact that Jesus also did not claim this passage to be non-inspired seems to be in line with Jesus' beliefs and behavior, which reflects both belief in the inspiration of the Hebrew Bible, and approval of the actions of the biblical god portrayed in it.

4) Jesus and the biblical god

Even though I've dealt with this matter to some extent earlier, in this section I will address in more detail the Gospels' account of the relation between Jesus' and the biblical god.

This wouldn't be required under the assumption - which is a belief held by versions of Christianity comprising nearly all adherents - that Jesus is the same entity as the biblical god, and that the Old Testament is inspired.

However, in order to cover alternative versions of Christianity who focus only on Jesus - who they claim is morally perfect - and the Gospels, let's see what the Gospels say about these matters:

Luke 16:

6 The law and the prophets were until John: since that time the kingdom of God is preached, and every man presseth into it.

17 And it is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail.

Matthew 5:17 Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil.

So, while it's not entirely clear what it is that will change, in those passages Jesus implies that the biblical god exists, and also implicitly endorses the biblical god's actions from a moral perspective.

But there are even more obvious passages, in which Jesus claims or implies that the biblical god is morally good - which is a false moral claim, given what we've seen in previous sections:

Mat 19:16 And, behold, one came and said unto him, Good Master, what good thing shall I do, that I may have eternal life?

Mat 19:17 And he said unto him, Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is, God: but if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.

There is no question here that Jesus' claims that the biblical god is morally good, and in fact, Jesus endorses the Old Testament as inspired.

Let's take a look at the transfiguration of Jesus:

Mark 9

2 And after six days Jesus taketh with him Peter, and James, and John, and leadeth them up into an high mountain apart by themselves: and he was transfigured before them.

3 And his raiment became shining, exceeding white as snow; so as no fuller on earth can white them.

4 And there appeared unto them Elias with Moses: and they were talking with Jesus.

5 And Peter answered and said to Jesus, Master, it is good for us to be here: and let us make three tabernacles; one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elias.

6 For he wist not what to say; for they were sore afraid.

7 And there was a cloud that overshadowed them: and a voice came out of the cloud, saying, This is my beloved Son: hear him.

8 And suddenly, when they had looked round about, they saw no man any more, save Jesus only with themselves.

Once again, the connection is made apparent in this passage:

Jesus is talking to Moses, but it's obvious that Jesus is not rebuking Moses for the evil commands he issued and false moral claims he made, or saying that those claims and commands did not come from the biblical god.

Rather, this passage actually stresses the links.

In context, the voice coming from the cloud is unmistakably that of the biblical god, and Jesus neither rebukes him for the atrocities he committed, nor claims that Moses committed those atrocities on his own.

In brief, there is no question here that the biblical god, Jesus, Elias and Moses are all on the same page so to speak, and in particular, Jesus endorses the actions of the biblical god described in the Old Testament, and those of Moses following the biblical god's commands.

Since many of those commands were profoundly immoral, and the moral claims false, it's clear that Jesus wasn't morally perfect.

Moreover, he was - according to the story, as usual - either the same entity as the biblical god, or someone working for him, or with him.

Objection 4.1) The passage of the transfiguration is allegorical. It didn't really happen, and the Gospel does not claim it happened.

Reply:

It's irrelevant to the matter at hand whether it's allegorical or not: even if it's allegorical, what is clear in that passage is that, according to the Gospel:

a) Jesus and the biblical god are at least on the same side.

b) Jesus endorsed the actions of the biblical god, described in the Old Testament, and claimed that the biblical god was morally good.

c) Jesus endorsed the actions of Moses, described in the Old Testament, as long as Moses was following commands by the biblical god

So, whether a correct interpretation of that particular passage is an allegorical one is beside the point.

Moreover, even if we leave that passage aside - but there is no good reason to do so -, the other passages I quoted are enough to show that Jesus endorsed the actions of the biblical god described in the Old Testament, and claimed that the biblical god was morally good.

Objection 4.2) Jesus was a reformist. He didn't come to endorse the Mosaic Law, but to change it. He even said that the law was given to the ancient Hebrews because their hearts were hard.

Reply:

It is true that, on one occasion, Jesus said that a specific part of the law had been given because of the hardness of the hearts of the ancient Hebrews. 
However, even if Jesus had said or implied that that was the case of all of the commands I considered earlier - which he did not -, that would still fail to provide any excuse for the actions of the biblical god, as I explained in a previous section.
Jesus did not say that the Old Testament was not inspired and that the actions described in it weren't actually the actions of the biblical god, but instead claimed or implied that those were in fact the actions of the biblical god. 
So, even if Jesus was a reformist, he still believed that the actions of the biblical god were not immoral - a false moral belief -, and that the biblical god was morally good - yet another false moral belief, given the biblical god's numerous atrocities  -, and in fact Jesus claimed that the biblical god was morally good - a false moral claim.
In short, Jesus had false moral beliefs, and made false moral claims, endorsing the actions of a monster. 
If he was the same entity as the biblical god, then Jesus himself was a monster. 
If not, he was at least confused about the moral character of the biblical god, if not just lying about that. 
Objection 4.3) You're taking those passages out of context by focusing on the connection between Jesus and the Old Testament, instead of taking into consideration all the good Jesus did, as described in the Gospels. 
Reply: 
I'm not taking anything out of context. Rather, I'm considering the context and making the connection between Jesus and the biblical god. 

Objecting that I'm only focusing on the bad is out of place: it would be like saying that if I said that a dictator who tortured people to death just for peacefully expressing disagreement with some of his policies acted immorally, I would be taking things out of context because the dictator in question, say, loved his children, and I did not point that out.

In fact, even if the dictator who tortured people to death just for disagreeing with some of his policies loved his children, and even if he did morally good things in a number of occasions - even in many occasions, actually -, that would not change the fact that he acted in a very immoral manner when he tortured people to death just for peacefully expressing disagreement.

The same goes for someone who is the dictator's enforcer, or a supporter: their degree of culpability would have to be assessed on a case by case manner, but surely there is some culpability on their part.

In the case of Jesus, if he is in fact the same entity as the biblical god, then even if he did good on some or many occasions, the fact remains that he's profoundly evil, given the previous sections.

If he is not the same entity as the biblical god, then Christianity in most of its versions is not true. Moreover, if he's not the same entity as the biblical god, but believed that the biblical god was morally good - as the Gospels show -, he still have false moral beliefs, and he made false moral claims when he expressed those beliefs.

Objection 4.4) Given all the good that Jesus did, and given that he's the same being as the biblical god, we can tell that the biblical god must have had some reasons for the commands he gave, for the false moral claims, and for other actions, even if we don't know what reason that is. 
Reply: 
First, that would be an irrational way of assessment of the evidence. 
We have to take a look at all of the description, concluding that if Jesus was the same being as the biblical god, he was profoundly evil, even if he also did good things a number of times. 
Second, given the extent of the atrocities committed by the biblical god and by his servant Moses, the claim of "mysterious reasons" appears even more obviously unreasonable - if possible. 
For that matter, someone could claim that Pol Pot wasn't morally bad, but was acting under the orders of a morally good creator who had mysterious reasons. 
Objection 4.5) The passages of the Old Testament that you quoted earlier are not inspired, and are actually false: the biblical god did not command or do any of that. Any passages of the Gospels that say or suggest otherwise are also neither inspired nor true. 
Reply: 
First, the connections to the Old Testament in general and to the laws given to the ancient Hebrews in particular are an integral part of the story in the Gospels. Removing them would make much of the story even more absurd. 
Second, and leaving that aside, it's unreasonable to pick and choose like that. Why remove those particular passages? 

5) Jesus and "family values"

Acting very much like a cult leader, Jesus told his disciples:

Luke 14:

26 If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple.

27 And whosoever doth not bear his cross, and come after me, cannot be my disciple.

28 For which of you, intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first, and counteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish it?

29 Lest haply, after he hath laid the foundation, and is not able to finish it, all that behold it begin to mock him,

30 Saying, This man began to build, and was not able to finish.

31 Or what king, going to make war against another king, sitteth not down first, and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand?

32 Or else, while the other is yet a great way off, he sendeth an ambassage, and desireth conditions of peace.

33 So likewise, whosoever he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple.

So, Jesus was telling them to abandon and hate their families: their parents, children, siblings, and so on. He even told them to hate themselves - but not to hate him, of course.

Now, if Jesus was in fact the biblical god, this immoral action pales in comparison with the previously described atrocities, so it's just a drop in the ocean.

If the biblical god existed and Jesus was a servant of that entity, what he did in this particular case was immoral, and we can add that to the general immorality of his actions in the service of the biblical god.

But if Jesus was a fully human preacher - which is actually the case -, this action indicates that he was far from being a good role model.

Rather, he was a cult leader, spreading his false religion and telling people to hate and abandon their families.

Objection 5.1) It would have been immoral for a fully human preacher to say that, but Jesus is the same being as the biblical god, and as the creator, he has sovereignty. 
Reply: 
First, if he's the same being as the biblical god, then the previous sections show that he's very evil. 
Second, that aside, there is no good reason to think that being the creator would excuse him for asking them to hate and abandon their families. 
Objection 5.2) That's a bad translation or interpretation. Jesus did not mean to say that they had to hate their families, but only that they should take second place to their dedication to Jesus.  
Reply: 
Even if that were the case, the point remains: 
If Jesus was the same being as the biblical god, then the previous sections show that he's very evil.
If he was a servant of the biblical god, that may be less bad, but still so. 
If he was a fully human preacher with no connection to the biblical god, this action shows that he was a cult leader telling people to abandon their families and put him first, while he was spreading his false religion. 
Objection 5.3) That passages is false. Jesus did not say that. 
Reply: 
First, picking and choosing which passages are true and which ones are not is an unreasonable way of assessing the evidence. 
So, whoever raises that objection but still claims that the Gospels are generally reliable, have the burden of arguing their case. 
Second, even if this passages is false, other passages still make a successful moral case, so the person raising that objection would have to reject many passages of both testaments, and at the same time provide a good argument to show that those particular passages - but not their favored ones - ought to be rejected. 
That would be a very heavy burden on any claimant; moreover, it would be incompatible with nearly all versions of Christianity. 

6) Hell

In earlier sections, I gave moral arguments that appear to suffice to reject Christianity as untrue, based on some of the actions of the biblical god described in the Old Testament.

However, based on the New Testament - as usually interpreted -, one can conclude that there are even worse actions carried out by the biblical god: arguments from Hell also show that Christianity is not true.

More precisely, they show that versions of Christianity comprising the vast majority of believers aren't true: In this section, I will consider different alternatives, assessing the consequences for Christianity.

6.1) Infinite Hell vs. finite Hell or no Hell

Versions of Christianity comprising the vast majority of adherents contend that Hell is infinite. This includes the largest denomination by far - the Roman Catholic Church -, which does not claim that Hell is a place of fire, but does claim it's infinite. [10]

However, some claim otherwise, or even deny that there is Hell at all.

In what follows, I will only focus on those that hold that Hell is infinite.

The rest of the versions are not affected by the following arguments, but are still vulnerable to the previous ones.

6.2) Hell as a place of torment vs. Hell as some state of mind or state of being

For most of the history of Christianity, Hell has been seen by most as a place of punishment, where the damned endure a number of torments.

However, nowadays there are competing views, including those that call Hell "a state of mind", or "a state of being".

Now, according to Christianity, the dead will eventually resurrect, so they will have bodies.

So, they will have to be put somewhere, so if the damned will be separated from the blessed - i.e., they won't be in the same place -, then whether the torment is caused by fire or by some other condition, it's difficult to see how that would not be a place of torment.

In any case, and while a lot could be said about those issues, it's not important to the moral case I'm making: whether the word "Hell" is used to denote the place where the damned will go, or some state of mind or being of those people, the important point here is that those people will endure eternal suffering, without possibility of escape - they don't even have the choice to be annihilated to end their torment.

Once it's clear that such eternal torment is imposed by the biblical god, the immorality of his actions will hopefully be apparent.

6.3) Hell as imposed by the biblical god vs. Hell as chosen by the damned

While the traditional view of Hell, for most of the history of Christianity, seems to have been that it was a punishment imposed by the biblical god, nowadays there are Christians who claim that even though Hell is a form of infinite suffering, it's freely chosen by the damned.

However, that alternative view is clearly untenable: it is easy to show, that if the biblical god is the creator and there is infinite Hell - in any of its variants -, then infinite Hell is imposed by the biblical god on the damned, rather than chosen by them:

Barring serious mental illness, people would not choose to suffer for eternity - not even bad people would make such choice -, unless, perhaps, they sacrifice themselves to save others, but that's not the case of under consideration.

As for those suffering from serious mental illness, they should not qualified as competent to make their own choice and endure eternal torment from it.

For instance, we do not allow mentally ill people to, say, set themselves on fire because they want to suffer, and for good reasons - and that's not even eternal suffering.

So, given the above, it is apparent that Hell is not chosen by the damned, but imposed on them by the biblical god.

Moreover, and while the previous considerations suffice, one can also point out that the damned are not allowed to leave or choose to be annihilated after a finite time in Hell, even though the biblical god - who created the rule according to which they end up in Hell - could easily let them go or destroy them, if he accepted.

Objection 6.3.1) The people in Hell freely choose to suffer for eternity by means of freely choosing to sin (or rejecting the Gospel, or generally meeting the conditions to avoid Hell in each version of Christianity), like criminals put themselves in prison or death row by freely choosing to commit crimes.

Reply:

Let's consider the following scenario:

Alice believes Hell does not exist.
Even if she was negligent and that's why she believes Hell does not exist – that is not the case, but leaving that aside - the fact remains that she believes Hell does not exist.
So, when she fails to meet the conditions to avoid Hell, she never expected that the consequences of her not meeting such conditions would be to go to Hell.
For instance, let's say Alice read the Gospel and was told by some Christians that if she failed to believe, or generally to trust Jesus as her lord and savior, she would go to Hell.

Some other Christians told her that there were some other conditions she had to meet in order to avoid Hell. And then, some Muslims told her there were some other conditions.
Now, Alice – very reasonably, but leaving that aside – did not believe any of the claims.
In fact, she came to the conclusion that the laws in question – namely, laws imposed by an immensely powerful creator that establish that failing to meet certain conditions would result in her going to Hell forever – did not exist.

Then, clearly she did not choose to be in Hell; that is the case regardless of whether Hell is a state of mind/being, a place of torment by fire, etc.; the point is that Alice did not choose to suffer for eternity.

If Alice indeed ends up in Hell, that's not her choice, but was put there. So, if Alice suffers for eternity, that suffering is not her choice, but the free choice of the biblical god, who imposes that suffering on her.

Now, let's consider another scenario:

Bob never heard of Christianity, Islam, or Hell. Moreover, the concept of eternal punishment is totally alien to him as well.

Once again, the conclusion is that he did not choose to suffer for eternity.

So, if Bob does end up suffering for eternity in Hell, then:

a) If Hell is a place, then the biblical god tossed Bob in there.

He may have done so personally or by proxy, or by some mechanism that sends people who fail to meet certain criterion to Hell, but the method of placing Bob in Hell is beside the point here.

b) If Hell is not a place but a state of mind or state of being, then the biblical god made humans in a way such that, regardless of what they want, if they don't meet certain criterion, they enter a state of perpetual suffering, of which they cannot ever escape.

Moreover, the biblical god has no mercy on them: even if they ask to be annihilated instead, the biblical god sticks to the infinite suffering instead.

Whether the biblical god imposes eternal suffering as a punishment or for some other reason, the point here is that he does impose eternal suffering.

That aside, even in the case of criminals, they generally do not choose to be put in prison or death row.

For instance, let's consider the following scenario:

In Iran, the law establishes that men who have sex with men shall be put to death.

Also, in Iran, and not expecting to get caught, Ali has sex with Mahmoud.

They get caught and put in prison for that, and later they're dragged to the place where they'll be executed, while they beg for mercy. Eventually, they are executed.

It's obviously not the case that they freely choose to be arrested or executed, even if they freely chose to have sex with each other.

Granted, in the case of infinite suffering imposed by an all-powerful, all-seeing entity, there is a difference: it would be absurd to believe one has a shot at escaping that fate, if one believes that such entity exists and has imposed such rules.

However, the point is that however one slices it, people do not freely choose to be in Hell - regardless of what else they freely choose to do.

Now, there are figurative senses in which someone can say that, for instance, if Tom robs a bank, he “put himself in prison”.

For instance, someone could say that Tom put himself in prison meaning that Tom made a free choice for which he deserved to be put in prison.

That may well be true, whereas it's not true that Ali and Mahmoud made a free choice for which they deserved to be arrested or executed. But in any case, this is a figurative sense of the expression “chose to be put in prison”.
In a literal sense, neither Ali or Mahmoud chose to be executed, nor did Tom choose to be put in prison.

Back to the cases of Alice and Bob, it's even more clear - if possible - that they did not literally made a free choice to suffer infinitely in Hell, but that if they end up suffering infinitely, that suffering was imposed on them by the biblical god.

Objection 6.3.2) The people in Hell freely choose to suffer for eternity, knowing that they would suffer for eternity.

Reply:

They would have to be severely mentally ill to do that, unless that's a condition to save someone else from the same fate, which is not the case under consideration.

Apart from the fact that that would limit Hell in a way that no version of Christianity holds (i.e., Hell only for some severely mentally ill people), it would still be an unacceptable action on the part of the biblical god to make a rule that some severely mentally ill people will suffer for eternity if they, due to their mental illness, choose to do so.

Objection 6.3.3) The people in Hell freely choose to reject the biblical god, who is God, and Hell is separation from the biblical god.

Even if the damned do not know that human minds are such that being separated from the biblical god results in terrible suffering - but they should know -, their choice to be separated from him is a free choice nonetheless. The biblical god is only respecting their free choice.

Reply:

First, previous sections show that the biblical god is not God - since he's not morally perfect -, but there is no need to rely on previous sections.

The point is that the claim that the biblical god is God is shown to be false by the fact that he inflicts infinite torment on people in Hell.

Second, it is not the case that they choose to reject the biblical god.

In many cases, people never even heard of him, and even when they have, they assess hat he does not exist and/or that he's a monstrous imaginary character.

That is an assessment, not a choice.

For instance, I do not choose to believe that the biblical god does not exist any more than I would choose to believe that, say, Athena, Thor or Darth Vader does not exist.

The same goes many if not all people who have heard of the biblical god and do not believe that he exists.

Even if there were any irrationality in making that assessment - there is not, but that aside -, the fact would remain that we do not make such a choice.

The same applies to the assessment that he is a monstrous character. That's an assessment, not a choice.

Third, even if, say, Mary freely chose to be separated from the biblical god for eternity without knowing that that would result in eternal torment, and even if she is at epistemic fault for not knowing, that still would not change the fact that the endless torment is imposed by the biblical god, rather than being freely chosen by Mary.

On that note, let's consider the following scenario:

Let us suppose that some human scientists genetically engineer some intelligent beings based on, say, pigs, but vastly modified. They are very intelligent, capable of talking, and they live for over a millennium.

Also, the scientists design their brains so that, if they're not in the presence of humans, their minds enter a state of horrible suffering - let's call that state "Bell".

Now, let's say that Pig is one of those beings, and his makers give him the chance of choosing to remain in their company, or to go to some other place, in the presence of individuals of his species and some other species, but no humans.

Additionally, they give Pig some clues that, if he follows them properly, would lead him to the conclusions that:

a) In the absence of humans, he will be in a state of terrible suffering.

b) If he chooses to be in the presence of his makers, he will be in the presence of humans for the rest of his life. But if he chooses otherwise, he won't be in the presence of humans ever again.

c) He will not be killed by request, and he won't be allowed to kill himself, either: there will be robots that will stop him from killing himself if he tried.

d) He almost certainly still has many centuries to live.

Now, Pig makes a badly mistaken assessment - let's say he's epistemically guilty -, and fails to realize that he will suffer at all if he's not in the presence of humans.

Then, Pig chooses not to be in the presence of his makers anymore.

So, his makers put him in a place without humans and - as he should have expected but didn't expect at all -, Pig begins to suffer tremendously.

In desperation, he asks to be put in the presence of humans again - there are no humans before him, but there are cameras and microphones that let his makers know what he's doing, saying, etc.

But his makers refuse, telling him that he freely chose to be in Bell, and they're only respecting his free choice.

So, he asks his makers to have mercy on him and kill him. But his makers reply that he's freely chosen to be in Bell for the rest of his life, which will almost certainly last for several centuries.

It is apparent in the scenario that Pig did not choose to be in Bell.

In other words, he did not choose to be in a state of terrible suffering.

It is true that he chose not to be in the presence of his makers - or other humans -, but that does not change the fact that Bell is not chosen by Pig; it's imposed by his makers.

In other words, the suffering is not chosen; it's imposed by his makers.

Given the amount of suffering, it's clear that Pig's makers are torturing him.

It should be also obvious that the actions of Pig's makers are morally unacceptable, but I will address the evil of hell in the next subsection.

In this subsection, the main point is that regardless of moral assessments, the fact is that Hell, like Bell, is not chosen by the people in Hell, but imposed on them.

In other words, just as horrible suffering is not chosen by Pig but is instead inflicted on him by his human makers, infinite torment is not chosen by the people in Hell but is inflicted on them by the biblical god, regardless of whether Hell is a place, a state of mind, or whatever it is.

Objection 6.3.3) Even if infinite suffering is inflicted on the damned by the biblical god, rather than chosen by the damned, he is respecting their free choice to be separated from him from eternity.

Even if the damned do not know that human minds are such that being separated from the biblical god results in terrible suffering - but they should know -, their choice to be separated from him is a free choice nonetheless. The biblical god is respecting their free choice.

Reply:

Actually, the biblical god would still be inflicting infinitely suffering on them, so this objection fails simply because it entails that Hell is not a choice, but is instead imposed by the biblical god: in other words, the infinite suffering is inflicted by the biblical god, so Hell is inflicted and not chosen.

So, that's enough to show that this objection fails.

Still, though unnecessary, one can point out that saying that the biblical god is respecting the free choice of the damned to be separated from him forever is also a gross misrepresentation of the actual situation: it gives the impression that somehow their freedom is being respected, while the opposite is the case.

It would be like saying that the makers of Pig are respecting his free choice to be separated from humans or from their makers.

Alternatively, we can easily see why their free choice is not being respected by means of the following scenario:

Let's suppose that in a distant realm, ruled absolutely by the Emperor, an imperial decree says that when a person turns eighteen, she has to choose between declaring herself a servant of the emperor and follow his commands without question - regardless of what they are -, or be classified as an undesirable (the decree applies to both men and women).

Also, the decree says that anyone who fails to follow a command from the Emperor is also classified as an undesirable.

The decree also establishes that a declaration of undesirability is irreversible, except if the Emperor chooses to make an exception - but the Emperor promises never to make an exception, and it seems he always keeps his word -, and that the punishment for undesirability is to be thrown naked and unarmed into a pit inhabited by a voracious and cunning monster, which will eat them mostly alive, eating non-vital organs first.

So, at eighteen, Luke refuses to serve the Emperor, escapes and joins a group of rebel fighters. Surely enough, Luke is classified as an undesirable.

Once Luke is captured, the Emperor sends a message to the rebels, stating: "I have chosen to respect the free choice made by your friend Luke."

So, the Emperor orders his enforcers to throw Luke into the pit; they follow the command, and Luke is eaten mostly alive, suffering great pain in the process and begging for mercy and for a quick death until he - eventually, but not quickly - dies.

Would it be sensible to say that the Emperor was just respecting Luke's free choice not to be a servant of the Emperor's and/or Luke's free choice to be an undesirable?

I hope it's clear enough that it would not be so.

Note that this would not change if the Emperor had instead - for instance - used advanced technology to make Luke, and had made Luke in a way such that refusing to serve him would cause Luke great pain for the rest of his life - which Luke did not know because of some epistemic mistake -, instead of tossing Luke into a pit with a [another] monster.

6.4) The evil of Hell

As we saw in the previous subsection, Hell is a form of infinite suffering imposed by the biblical god on some people.

I hope at this point it is clear to the reader how immoral the actions biblical god are: we're talking about inflicting suffering on people for a thousand years, then a million years, then a trillion years, and then more - it just never ends.

There is no relief, or hope of relief. They may beg for mercy, or even ask to be annihilated. But there is no way out for them: they're damned forever, by the biblical god.

So, let's take a look at the objections:

Objection 6.4.1) There is no infinite Hell. That's a mistaken interpretation of Christianity.

Reply:

As I pointed out earlier, versions of Christianity comprising the vast majority of adherents contend that Hell is infinite, but some claim otherwise, or even deny that there is Hell at all.

If a version of Christianity denies that there is infinite Hell - or, at least, does not affirm that there is -, then it's immune to the previous points in this section.

However, some of the points made in earlier sections still show that they're not true.

Objection 6.4.2) The people in Hell deserve to suffer forever, for their sins, and so the biblical god is doing justice by imposing infinite suffering on them.

Reply:

Even if one considers some of the worst crimes, like some cases of murder, rape, rape plus murder, etc., that seems is not true: if someone commits such actions, arguably they deserve to suffer for that, so someone might say that they deserve to suffer for years, or even for decades, or perhaps even for centuries.

I don't know what's the maximum they might deserve, but one thing appears clear: they don't deserve to suffer for eternity.

One should, perhaps, stop for a moment and consider what the concept of Hell entails: It's suffering for millions of years, and then trillions of years, and then more, and so on. It just never ends.

The punishment seems clearly infinitely disproportionate even in the case of the worst criminals.

Objection 6.4.3)The people in Hell deserve to suffer forever, not so much for adultery, rape or murder - which only merit finite punishment -, but for the infinite sin of offending (and/or disobeying) a morally perfect creator, the biblical god - who is God.

Reply:

Of course, one could add the point that, as previous sections show, the biblical god is far from being morally perfect, but there is no need for that: confusing terminology aside, if one ponders the matter carefully, it should be apparent that disobeying an order from a creator - even if he were morally perfect - would not make a human being deserving of infinite suffering.

In other words, even if God exists, then offending God simply does not merit infinite punishment.

If one considers this carefully, it should be apparent that the claim that people actually deserve to go to Hell is in serious conflict with our sense of right and wrong:

For example, if the objection were correct, then the normal human moral outrage against a serial rapist and murderer because of what he did to their victims - not to some morally perfect creator -, would be completely out of place, since whatever he did to his victims - for what he might deserve severe but finite punishment - would pale in comparison with what, say, a shoplifter did to a morally perfect being - for which the shoplifter would deserve infinite punishment.

The previous consideration would not be affected by the fact that the serial rapist and murderer would also deserve infinite punishment for offending the morally perfect creator - maybe even more than the shoplifter if somehow he offended him more -, because in that case, the shoplifter would still deserve infinitely more punishment for offending the morally perfect creator than the serial rapist and murderer would deserve for what he did to the victims of his rapes and murders.

So, the focus on what the rapist and murderer did to his victims would be just a complete failure of our moral sense.

Even most people who have religious beliefs - most people -, and even most Christians, do react as above.

Incidentally, many Christians who have pondered the matter seem to have reached the same conclusion - namely, that humans do not deserve infinite suffering - and nowadays many Christians reject the idea of an infinite punishment imposed by the biblical god, and instead maintain that Hell is some state chosen by those in Hell, or that Hell is finite or nonexistent.

While the view that Hell is finite or nonexistent does avoid the argument from Hell - though some of the points made in earlier sections still show that those versions of Christianity are not true, either -, the claim that Hell is chosen by those in Hell is untenable, as we saw in the previous subsection,

Objection 6.4.4) The people in Hell deserve to suffer forever, not so much for adultery, rape or murder, but for the infinite sin of causing infinite suffering on a morally perfect creator, who abhors any wrongdoing, and whose infinite suffering increases with every single immoral action (or, as an variant of this objection, with some specific immoral actions). The suffering of each of the damned is similar to the suffering he inflicted on the biblical god, who is God.

Reply:

As usual, there's always the alternative of pointing out that the biblical god is far from being morally perfect, as previous sections show, so he isn't God.

Also, and for reasons similar to those given above, this objection too flies in the face of our moral sense, so even if God exists, human do not deserve infinite suffering.

In addition to that, we can point out the following:

1) If a being is morally perfect, it does not follow from that that he will suffer eternally for all, or for some immoral actions committed by others.

It seems a lot more intuitive that if he suffers at all, he suffers only until the wrongdoer has been adequately punished. Also, the level of suffering usually resulting from being offended is not remotely comparable with the level of suffering in Hell, as usually described.

Granted, someone might claim that the particular morally perfect being that exists does suffer forever, and as much as someone in Hell does, for every immoral action anyone commits, but there is no good reason to assume so, and in fact, there are very good reasons to believe otherwise (see below).

2) If a being - say, B - were to suffer for eternity for every single immoral act that occurs - and with a level of suffering comparable to that of the people in Hell for every single case -, then freely carrying out an act of creation from which - he knows ­- some immoral actions will eventually result, would appear to be a free choice to be in Hell forever: He could freely choose not to create - or not to create anything that would yield that result -, and nothing bad would happen to him as a result.

So, it seems clear that it's not a case of negligence if a human does not factor in - when she acts - the possibility of the suffering of a being with such a completely alien kind of mind.

To put a concrete example: intuitively, it's clear that a shoplifter does not have to factor in the potential infinite suffering of radically alien invisible beings when she considers whether or not to shoplift, anymore than she has to consider the possibility that, say, eating an apple will result in some invisible entity suffering infinite torment because said entity suffers when someone eats apples.

While it's true that she has a moral sense that tells her not to shoplift but tells her nothing against eating apples, her moral assessment about shoplifting involve considerations about the well-being of the owner of the shop, other humans, etc., but not of about a being with a radically different kind of mind, who would freely choose to make morally flawed entities, even though he knows that that will result in eternal suffering for him.

Similar considerations apply if the being suffers eternally for some but not all immoral actions.

3) If any immoral action by a human merited infinite punishment for making God suffer, then it seems that at the very least said human would have to have a reliable means of realizing that that is the case - or that there is a non-negligible chance of it - before acting.

In light of 2), and in light of the considerations given in the reply to the previous objection, that seems clearly not to be the case.

4) This objection would have the odd result that the creator would be in Hell: he would be one of the damned.

In fact, he would be in the worst kind of Hell, since he would suffer infinitely and to an extent similar to the suffering of each of the human damned for every single one of them.

That does not appear to be compatible with Christianity at all.

Objection 6.4.5) Our sense of right and wrong cannot be trusted on these matters, since it's flawed because of the fall. We ought to listen to the biblical god instead, since his sense of right and wrong is perfect.

Reply:

That would amount to simply assume Christianity, instead of assessing whether it's true.

As I explained when replying to preliminary objections, we can properly use our sense of right and wrong to assess whether a religion is true, and this objection presents no good reason to except Christianity from that evaluation.

Objection 6.4.6) Jesus suffered for our sins and died on the cross to save us. If some people ungratefully reject his offer, it's only fair that they suffer for eternity.

Reply:

First, they do not reject any offers.

They do not believe that there is an offer in the first place.

Even if they know that there is a claim made by Christians that there is an offer made by Jesus, they do not believe that Jesus is alive, or making any offers:

Often, unbelievers - very reasonably - do not believe that preachers live for thousands of years, and - also, very reasonably - do not believe that Jesus had any kind of superpowers, or was anything but human.

Obviously, not all unbelievers are like that. Muslims, for instance, don't believe in Christianity, but believe that Jesus still exists; but they too do not believe that there is an offer from Jesus to avoid Hell by becoming Christians.

Reasonableness aside, even if there were some epistemic guilt on the part of all unbelievers; even if there were some irrationality in reaching the conclusion that there is no Hell, and/or no offer from Jesus to be accepted or rejected, etc., the point would remain that they would not deserve infinite torment for making such an error.

Second, if the biblical god chose to suffer as a means of giving some people a chance to avoid the infinite torment he himself would otherwise impose on them, that's merely another odd quirk of his personality.

But the fact that the biblical god suffered by choice has nothing to do with the fact that human beings do not deserve to be tormented forever, by whatever means.

Even if Jesus were giving all humans a chance to avoid eternal punishment by worshiping him, he would still be coercing humans into worshiping him under the unjust threat of infinite torment.

So, even if some people were actually rejecting his offer, it wouldn't be fair that they would suffer for eternity:

Those few rejecting the offer would be courageous people who would stand up against a monster who demands worship under the threat of infinite torment. Perhaps, they would also be foolish because they would have no chance against the biblical god's immense power.

But what they wouldn't be is deserving of infinite torment just because they refuse to worship the entity threatening to impose infinite torment of them.

7) Conclusion:

In light of the behavior of the biblical god, it seems clear that he's not morally good.

Moreover, if he's a moral agent at all - which Christianity seems to maintain [11]-, he seems to be evil.

Of course, while this is enough to conclude that Christianity is not true, that does not entail that the biblical god does not exist.

My position is that are good reasons to believe that he does not exist, but that's beyond the scope of this article.

Notes and references

[1] Someone might object to this and say that Christianity is a single religion, even if Christians sometimes disagree with each other on some doctrinal issues.

There is no need to discuss that here, though: whether they're different religions or one religion with different interpretations, my point is that I'll try to make arguments that apply to nearly all or all of those religions and/or interpretations.

[2] Or, for that matter, Catholic Tradition, or some other religious book or source.

I will focus on the Bible for the sake of brevity, since the reply is essentially the same in other cases.

[3] It is true that ancient Hebrew lawmakers - and, perhaps, most ancient Hebrews - did not make such assessments. That fact, however, is not problematic, as I will explain later, when consider a specific objection.

[4] One could also mention the fact that looking at the hymen is an unreliable method of ascertaining whether a woman has had sex, or that she might have been raped but the rape wasn't proved, etc.

However, there is no need for that, as the command would still be immoral - and the claim or implication that she deserves to be stoned to death false -, even if the method were reliable.

[5] The Catholic "New American Bible" includes whipping him as part of the punishment.

[6] Of course, if one puts aside for a moment the assumption that the biblical god exists and assesses the evidence properly, the conclusion is that he does not exist, and the monsters were the human writers of that law.

[7] Someone might suggest or claim that chimpanzees, bonobos and a few other non-human animals are moral agents. But the law is not limited to those animals.

Further, there were no such animals in the territories were the ancient Hebrews lived.

[8] I included this objection after a Christian I was talking to actually raised it.

But it's hard to see how people from our time and with at least an average level of education in a developed country can seriously say that the non-human animals may have been possessed by demons.

Then again, they believe that an entity with superhuman powers gave the ancient Hebrews the law, that Jesus resurrected, and they raise a number of other absurd objections to arguments against Christianity - including some of the ones I'm considering -, so I guess one shouldn't be surprised by this particular one after all.

[9] Of course, that his commands and claims resemble the brutality of their society is no surprise if one assesses the evidence properly and concludes that there was no biblical god giving those commands, but were made up precisely by some of the leaders of their society.

However, as long as we keep the assumption that the biblical god did it, the conclusion is that his actions were unacceptable.

[10] Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1033-1037.

Source: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/__P2O.HTM

It's true that the Catholic Church also claims that Hell is freely chosen by those in Hell, but that claim is untenable.

[11] Even if some Christian philosophers maintain that he's not a moral agent because - allegedly - "morally good" when applied to God does not mean what's usually meant by "morally good", and the biblical god is God, that would not be a successful objection to this moral case.