On his website, William Lane Craig pointed to some of Michael Murray’s arguments as potential replies to the argument from suffering, at least when it comes to the pain of non-human animals.
I’m planning to write a couple of brief posts commenting on some of Craig’s and Murray’s arguments, as outlined on Craig’s website , and raise objections to at least two of Murray’s suggested replies 
The first suggestion – which Murray calls “response 1”; I will use the same terminology – is that perhaps non-human animals do not have what Murray calls “phenomenal consciousness” of the pain, but only what he calls “access consciousness”.
On this proposal, basically non-human animals would be in pain sometimes, but they would not be aware that they’re in pain – something similar to blindsight, going by Murray’s example.
So, on this proposal, non-human animals would experience pain, but wouldn’t feel it – not in the sense of “feel” that would be relevant if this understanding of pain were correct.
The second suggestion – “response 2” - is that animal pain is like what Murray calls “lobotomy pain”; that pain would be felt, but wouldn’t be undesirable, in other words, the pain in question would not have a “negative mental valence to it”, in Murray’s words.
To be clear, Murray does not claim that non-human animal pain is actually like that, but rather, he claims we do not know it’s not.