tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post8636661594912734846..comments2021-02-03T22:47:48.381-08:00Comments on Angra Mainyu's blog: A Reply to the Kalam Cosmological Argument (v. 7.4.1)Angra Mainyuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post-52497538573667080822016-06-08T09:45:23.618-07:002016-06-08T09:45:23.618-07:00With regard to the timeless free choice, I think C...With regard to the timeless free choice, I think Craig would probably reject two different timeless states, one prior to another, since God in his timeless state is allegedly changeless. In the essay above, I challenge that alleged changeless on the grounds that it seems indistinguishable from a first moment in time, etc., but his position seems to be that God always intended to create in the timeless state; he probably would deny that a free choice needs a time or state at which it hasn't been made. <br />I don't have time for a full argument, unfortunately, but here's a consequence of some of his points: in the timeless state, according to Craig, knows the proposition "Ganssle types on December 14, 2006." (which is tenseless); see <a href="http://www.iep.utm.edu/god-time/#SH7b" rel="nofollow">this IEP entry</a>. That requires a certain (even if timeless) mental state (God's timeless mental state at a world where he doesn't create anything would be different from that in the actual world), and at every world with the same initial segment as the actual world (in the causal order), God has the same mental state (since the timeless state is the causally first state of the world), and so God knows that Ganssle types, and so Ganssle then types. It follows that the actual world is the only possible world with the same initial segment as this world, in the causal order (even though according to Craig, the world is not causally determined). I suppose that someone might say that God's mental state in the timeless state does not count as part of the initial segment in the causal order, but I'd say there is no good reason not to count it. <br />At any rate, even if the argument from the causally same initial segment, we have the following argument: any world that shares a temporal initial segment with the actual world, is the actual world (that follows from God's mental states and his infallible foreknowledge; there is an asymmetry in the case of humans, so I think a similar case wouldn't work). <br /><br />P.S.: thanks for the appreciation of my articles. I don't think I'll be able to write anything long and detailed for the foreseeable future (I'm also focusing on other things), but maybe some day I will.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post-31280697605743827122016-06-08T09:45:05.683-07:002016-06-08T09:45:05.683-07:00Regarding God's knowledge, I use it only becau...Regarding God's knowledge, I use it only because it indicates a change in God's beliefs* (whatever those are), i.e., in his mental states. <br />Knowlegdge per se wouldn't do be enough, since a person's knowledge might change without any actual changes in that person. <br />For example, Bill knows that his car is in his garage. If the car is stolen while he's at work, Bill no longer knows it, but he hasn't changed. <br />But when Bill finds out, his beliefs change - and that's a change in Bill, even if accidental, small, etc. <br />However, God's beliefs* (whether they're beliefs/immediateperceptions/whatever they are) cannot be false, and moreover, he knows everything, so when something changes, so do God's beliefs*. <br /><br />Btw, the theist you're talking to seems to be denying (even if implicitly) that God is temporal with the universe; he seems to be implying that God is timeless at every state. <br />That wouldn't work on presentism (as Craig himself argues), since God knows that (say) 1935 is past and 2016 (or rather, a moment in it) is present, but in a century God will know 2016 is past, etc., so his knowledge (and his beliefs*) change. That is an intrinsic change in God, not just in the relations between God and other entities. Craig argues for intrinsic change, for example see <a href="http://www.reasonablefaith.org/timelessness-and-omnitemporality" rel="nofollow">this article</a>, though Craig's argument is based on God's knowledge, while I would base it on God's beliefs* corresponding to that knowledge, since knowledge sometimes might change without intrinsic change in some cases (not in God's case, but I think that needs an explanation, which is I why I point to God's beliefs*). <br />Even if God has no beliefs but awareness of propositions, he is aware at some times that a certain proposition (like "1945 is present") is true, and at some times, he's aware that it is not true, so that's an intrinsic change (i.e., what changes is his state of mind, this "awareness", whatever it is).Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post-11506340177081020432016-06-08T01:52:41.134-07:002016-06-08T01:52:41.134-07:00Angra, the conversation descended into a complete ...Angra, the conversation descended into a complete failure to accept that whatever label you put on non essential properties there are those that are mere relational properties, and those that are non essential properties had by things themselves. But I'll chew on your response regarding God knowing- this particular theist does indeed think God lacks beliefs, and thoughts, but has awareness of 'propositions' I asked if this was conscious awareness, because I have real trouble making sense of that, and again no response came (consciousness without duration?) But still, yes there looks to be problems however it plays out.<br /><br />On Meta time, I intend to ask more questions, as it has been adopted to avoid many of the problems associated with timelessness and I think he believes that meta time will avoid timelessness and avoid the problem of 'cosmic' temporality. I would think his notion is similar to one Craig is 'sympathetic' to, a sort of fifth dimension orthogonal to the 4th dimension of time (like hypertime). I guess this is undifferentiated dense time or something, to avoid the idea of an actual infinity of discrete states.<br /><br />I don't think Craig though thinks this would be immune to powerful objections that totally undermine the KCA.<br /><br />On the 'timeless intention' to create, Craig says this is 'freely chosen'. But if God has always had prior to creation this intent, and never began to exist, at what state did he choose? At the moment the intent was chosen did he create simultaneously, and there was time? But then in what sense was the intention ever timeless? Craig seems to indicate there is indeed a timeless state of intention, but it seems he's committed to two distinct timeless states if he wants there to be a free choice 1) prior to choice 2) when choice is made. <br /><br />Apologies if these replies take up too much of your personal time- but your articles are very much appreciated and are an excellent rebuttal to the Kalam, I would love more and hope you can find time in the future.Fox ITKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00279690931742754745noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post-45900779886896076192016-06-07T15:43:39.371-07:002016-06-07T15:43:39.371-07:00Regarding Bill's example, I agree that when hi...Regarding Bill's example, I agree that when his grandfather dies and Bill loses that property, that isn't a change in Bill (it's actually a relation between Bill and another person what changes). <br />But let's say that Bill now learns that his grandfather just died. Bill changes from believing that his grandfather is alive to believing that his grandfather is dead. Bill's mind has changed (his knowledge changed to, but I prefer to avoid issues with the epistemic status of his belief). The change may be small, accidental, etc., but it's still a change in Bill's state of mind. <br />Granted, the theist may think that God doesn't have beliefs, and that if we talk about God's beliefs, we're speaking by analogy, because we cannot comprehend the mind of God enough to describe it more accurately, but God has an immediate perception of truths, etc. (or something along those lines).<br />However, that doesn't affect the point about change: in the timeless state, God believes, intuitively and/or immediately perceives and/or apprehends in a godly way (or whatever we call it; let's say "believes*" for short) that the universe does not exist. At time 0, he believes* that the universe does exist, and that time t=0 is present; at time 1 (the next moment in the presentist's account), God believes* that t=1 is present, t=0 is past, and the universe exists. And so on. So, God changes from his state of mind at the timeless state of the world to his state of mind at t=0, and then keeps changing. <br />By the way, does the theist believe that God does not change even after t=0, t=1, etc.? (I'm asking because Craig believes God does change later). <br /><br />Regarding your question, thanks for the link. I'm afraid I don't have any links with good replies at hand, and some commitments in meatspace are keeping me too busy these days to make a commitment to analyze his article in sufficient detail to post a reply. So, sorry I can't be of help.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post-22953210872897847292016-06-07T14:01:28.087-07:002016-06-07T14:01:28.087-07:00Thanks again for the reply.
The move to a timeles...Thanks again for the reply.<br /><br />The move to a timeless state is being argued to not be a change in God as you state and I concur with, but a change in the world- changes like this are extrinsic apparently (despite this not being defined) in the sense described in this example:<br /><br /> Bill has the property of being a grandson. His grandfather dies and he loses that property, but this isn't a change in Bill, but a change in something else in the world, so despite losing a property, Bill hasn't changed in his being.<br /><br />All apparent changes are being described as this- he believes the entering into time was simultaneous with creation, but not a change just the loss of a property, or the gaining of a new one in virtue of time existing- this isn't a change in God, so there is then no need to account for how this change was instantaneous. <br /><br />I find this just bizarre, because clearly a great many changes we want to speak of (not just of God) as changes, aren't just this kind of Cambridge Change, but changes in those beings themselves.<br /><br />On 'meta time' I agree- I think he risks many of the criticisms leveled against so called 'cosmic time' being raised. Alas he hasn't replied to my attempt for clarity.<br /><br /><br />As an aside, my discussion with this theist has led me to start reading this article by Craig he has linked to regarding Divine timelessness and personhood ( a case he hasn't made, but he scrambled for this link). I have only just begun to see if Craig is successful, any thoughts on it you might have (or links to good replies on it) would be much appreciated:<br /><br />http://www.reasonablefaith.org/divine-timelessness-and-personhood<br /><br />Fox ITKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00279690931742754745noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post-16831609961094133692016-06-07T07:34:54.762-07:002016-06-07T07:34:54.762-07:00I agree that the theist's position is mistaken...I agree that the theist's position is mistaken: clearly, on the view he (or Craig) describes, God does change from his timeless state to his first temporal state: If God is timeless at state of the world S1 and temporal at S2, then that's a difference between the two states, and so it's a change (and a change in God). <br />Moreover, God also changes in that at his timeless state, he knows that he is timeless. At his first temporal state, he knows that he is temporal, and that the time is prior to any other time, etc. So, it follows from the description given in the theistic account that God changes (because he is different at different states). If those changes are extrinsic, accidental, very minor, minuscule, the smallest possible changes, or whatever, those are still changes. <br />Now, if at least one of those changes in God is not caused at all, then it follows from the theistic account that causeless changes are possible. Why then, should one believe that everything that begins to exist has a cause? Moreover, if there is no cause of that change, then God found himself changed - he didn't bring about his own change -, which is a problem in its own right. <br />On the other hand, if all of the changes in God are brought about (or caused, if you like) by God's decision at the first temporal state of the universe, the the whole change from the timeless state (which is allegedly causally prior to the first temporal state) to the first temporal state (which is allegedly causally later) was in fact brought about by something at the first temporal state, contradicting the alleged causal priority of the timeless state. <br /><br />So, it seems that the theist is committed to the conclusion that some of the changes were brought about by God's decision at the timeless state. But then, what's the ontological difference between a first timeless state as the causally first state, and a first temporal state (with no timeless state at all) as the causally first state. It seems that despite the use of the word "timeless", the description supports no difference between the alleged timeless state and a first temporal state. Moreover, a change caused at the first temporal state is in turn problematic on the theist's radical presentism. <br />Side note: I think this sort of presentism can be challenged on other grounds (I think decisively). <br /><br />Regarding the meta time issue, I would need more details. For example, if he finds that route acceptable for the theist, why might the universe not exist in meta time? How is metatime described?Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post-38465654301787598142016-06-07T04:51:22.432-07:002016-06-07T04:51:22.432-07:00Thanks for the reply Angra.
The theist I am in di...Thanks for the reply Angra.<br /><br />The theist I am in discussion with wants to hold that God's state is not and does not change in essential or accidental properties, and even when he is no longer wholly timeless or when he acts on his intention, that these are just extrinsic changes with relation to a change in some other state (like Cambridge Change). That seems wrong to me, the loss of these properties seems like a change in God- even if non essential. Regardless, the same could hold for presumably anything if this is his account of change, making the statement 'God is unchanging' somewhat trivial.<br /><br />And those changes still need to be accounted for- he seems to think that the change from being timeless sans creation to in time with creation was purely instantaneous despite being a presentist of the kind Craig is, where the 'present' is not made up of durationless instants. I find the notion of the creation event (the creation of time) bizarre if considered simultaneous with its cause- being simultaneous means 'at the same time' are they really saying that time began to exist at the same time that it was caused to exist? <br /><br />In addition, he seems torn between the idea of 'timeless sans creation' and 'in meta time prior to creation' what are your thoughts if the Craigstian takes this route rather than the former? Fox ITKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00279690931742754745noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post-42584334344801469572016-06-06T19:45:21.368-07:002016-06-06T19:45:21.368-07:00Hi Fox in the Know,
You're right about that i...Hi Fox in the Know,<br /><br />You're right about that if essentialism is true, then it follows any X with an essential property Y always possesses Y as long as X pertains, so everything that chances and still exists only changes accidentally. <br />So, it follows from the claim that God exists necessarily that his essential properties do not change. Craig claims that God is <i>not</i> changeless with creation, but does change, so he's talking about accidental changes. <br />In any case, I would be inclined to reply that the issues of accidental vs. essential changes or intrinsic vs. extrinsic properties, just don't raise any trouble for the arguments I make. <br />For example, in 2.1.2.1 and 2.1.3.6, I compare two scenarios, and argue that the relevant states appear ontologically identical; one might grant that the changes are accidental, and grant that the properties are either extrinsic or intrinsic (whatever the theist prefers), and my point seem to go hold just as well. <br />But perhaps the theist is raising a specific objection to one of my arguments on the basis of one of such distinctions, or you have some other part of my post in mind? If so, please let me know.Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post-48664182996368834212016-06-06T14:01:23.750-07:002016-06-06T14:01:23.750-07:00Hi Angra
I am involved with a debate with a Chris...Hi Angra<br /><br />I am involved with a debate with a Christian Theist who argues that the sorts of changes God seems to though highlighted above, are not changes in God's essential properties, rather they are changes in his accidental extrinsic properties.<br /><br />He therefore claims God is still 'unchanging'<br /><br />My response to this is- this is a vacuous account of change, if essentialism is true, then it follows any X with an essential property Y always possesses Y as long as X pertains. Everything tha exists can change only in its accidental properties, that's what they mean. Of course essential properties might not always obtain but that just means X no longer obtains.<br /><br />In addition, that God intends to create, that he was sans creation wholly timeless, these seem to me like they wouldn't be extrinsic properties but intrinsic even if not essential.<br /><br /><br />But am I wrong on this? It sounds like a desperate attempt to maintain the notion that God is unchanging in the face of similar objections posted in your paper. How would you respond to this? Many thanks.Fox ITKhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/00279690931742754745noreply@blogger.com