tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post4139555103015641944..comments2021-02-03T22:47:48.381-08:00Comments on Angra Mainyu's blog: Morality and ontological grounding. Some comments on Craig's metaethical argument.Angra Mainyuhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post-19172755286559299682015-02-01T14:28:37.388-08:002015-02-01T14:28:37.388-08:00Hi again Felippe,
Okay, so while the longer post...<br />Hi again Felippe, <br /><br />Okay, so while the longer post I was writing is not ready yet (I keep adding details, so it's getting longer), I'm going to post a shorter version which deals specifically with the worry you raise, and defends my claim that that's not an option for the DCTist. Additionally, it suggests another problem for the DCTist, in terms of potential non-theistic accounts that any defender of the metaethical argument (and any DCTist) would have to defeat. <br /><br />That shorter post is ready, so it should be up in a few minutes. If you read it, please let me know if you think that some parts are not clear, so that I clarify them. <br /><br />With regard to your question, I haven't been following the exchange. But I'll take a look; thanks for the tip. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post-59969447031841437832015-02-01T12:25:05.006-08:002015-02-01T12:25:05.006-08:00Hello again Angra,
I think you got my point corre...Hello again Angra,<br /><br />I think you got my point correctly, most of it. I was primarly concerned if defining God as the maximally great being would entail that DCT is true, but I think that if your approach is correct there is no such option for the DCTist. <br /><br />This can be a little off-topic, but are you following the Feser-Parsons debate on morality? That is a great piece of exchange.Narcisohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08017770745142918762noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post-29983362121385415032015-01-27T18:46:13.263-08:002015-01-27T18:46:13.263-08:00Hi, Felippe,
Thanks.
With regard to your objec...Hi, Felippe, <br /><br />Thanks. <br /><br />With regard to your objection to Morriston's arguments, I'm just writing a new reply to Craig's metaethical argument that addresses that worry – if I understood your point right - and others, by arguing that defining "God" as a maximally great being is not a move available to the DCTist, other than to pick the right entity, so to speak. <br /><br />It's still a draft (in a non-traditional format; I set up a debate between a defender of each position), but briefly, a problem I raise is that it's a transparent conceptual truth (as Craig uses the words) that maximal greatness entails maximal moral goodness, so it would be like saying that to be morally good is to resemble some qualities of a being that is maximally morally good. But that leaves us in the dark as to what moral goodness is. <br /><br />An alternative reply - one that does not rely on the conceptual connection between maximal greatness and maximal moral goodness -, is to ask the DCTist what the ontological foundation of <i>greatness</i> is. <br /><br />Any reply like 'greatness is resemblance to God in some relevant respects' - or any other involving God - would have a circularity problem if 'God' is defined as "the greatest conceivable being", because the account would be saying that greatness is resemblance to a being that is maximally great, in some relevant respects. As an analogy, it would be improper to say that to be a meter long is to be as long as the distance between two lines that are at a distance of a meter. <br /><br />There is a way out of this for the DCTist, but it has a cost: the DCTist would have to say that the definition of the word “God” is just a means of pointing at the right entity – since God is not a physical object, one can't just point one's finger at him. <br />So, for example, one might as well use some other property to pick the right object - in this case, God -, and the identification holds. One might just say that moral goodness is resemblance to the only omniscient, omnipotent, maximally kind and loving being that exists, in some relevant respects, or resemblance to some qualities of that entity, etc. <br /><br />In that way, circularity is avoided, but the cost is that the definition of 'God' as the GCB is lost. <br /><br />For example, let's say that there is a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, and maximally loving and kind, for the sake of the argument. Let's name that being “Luke”. Now, that just picks an - assumed – actual being by naming some of its properties - enough to identify him uniquely -, and then uses a proper name – Luke – to name that being.<br /><br />Then, one might still ask: "Why is Luke good?" <br />It would be improper for the DCTist to say that by definition, Luke is morally good. <br /><br />The DCTist may still say that Luke is the paradigm of goodness, that he is the GCB, and/or that it's a necessary brute fact that he's morally good, but that's not like saying that it's by definition. The DCTist still needs some brute fact like that.<br /><br />A non-theist might respond that, perhaps, to be morally good is to have certain qualities like being disposed to be kind in such-and-such situations, having such-and-such feelings in such-and-such situations, etc., and then propose that the alternative theory (which might not be true, but it's a suggestion) is at least no less plausible than DCT (which the DCTist may deny, but then it's a debate on who one has a more plausible suggestion; as you may have guess, in my assessment the non-theist wins hands down – and the non-theist may also insist that she does not actually need to present any accounts, though that's a different argument). <br /><br />I'm not sure that addresses your specific worry (please let me know if I missed your point) and it's clear enough, though. The new reply has a more elaborate explanation, but <br />I can post a briefer reply to the metaethical argument before the draft is ready, only containing the relevant part of the hypothetical debate, if you like. Angra Mainyuhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16342860692268708455noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-207940809631227645.post-22467264752634015812015-01-27T15:40:24.215-08:002015-01-27T15:40:24.215-08:00Hi Angra,
I'd like to say how much I like yo...Hi Angra, <br /><br />I'd like to say how much I like your writings on this blog and others such as ex apologist's and the Secular Outpost.<br /><br />Anyhow, I've done lots of thinking on the moral argument and Morriston's objections to it, and my thoughts are that defining God as the maximally great being cuts Morriston's "moral properties are simpler" argument.<br /><br />However, I'm not sure how to support this. I haven't done much reading on the ontological argument but my thoughts are that such a being would be "maximally independent" as one could be. What I mean by this is that God would- and therefore could not be- dependent on such properties to be considered morally good. In other words, God, as defined, would necessarily depend only on his moral character to be good (that would entail that, if God exists, DCT is true, and, if an objective morality must be applicable logically to all possible beings, then premise 1 of the argument is correct)<br /><br />I'm sure there is an error somewhere. Perhaps Morriston's argument entails that a maximally great being, if exists, would need such properties to be good, but I'm not sure how to support that either. <br /><br />Perhaps an analogy could be that I could also say that such being would, as part of its greatness, win any game in any condition anyway it wants, and thus it would entail that it can win odd or even on the mirror with even. Of course that is impossible, so what this being can be depends on what we know of the world and not the other way around.<br /><br />I'm not a philosopher, by all means (else I'd probably know how to answer this) but these are my thoughts. Any replies would be appreciated.Narcisohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08017770745142918762noreply@blogger.com